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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is from a final Order of the Third District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The Plaintiff 
appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. The Utah 
Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review this matter pursuant to 
Section 78-2-2(3) (j) of the Utah Code Annotated (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Whether the trial court correctly amended its prior 
Order dated January 2, 1996? Whether an ambiguity exists is a 
question of law for which this Court accords no deference to the 
trial court's decision. Willard Pease Oil & Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil 
& Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted). With 
regard to the mistake of fact claim, mistake of fact is an action 
based in equity, for which appellate courts will reverse a trial 
court's finding only if it is clearly erroneous. Despain v. 
Despain, 855 P.2d 254, 257 (Utah App. 1993); Reid v. Mutual of 
Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989). 
II. Whether Appellee Plumb is entitled to an award of 
his attorney's fees incurred in this appeal? f! [A] provision for 
payment of attorney's fees in a contract includes attorney's fees 
incurred by the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial, if 
the action is brought to enforce the contract." Salmon v. Davis 
County, 916 P.2d 890, 896 (Utah 1996) (quoting Management Services 
v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406, 409 (Utah 1980)). More-
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over, "the prevailing party in a dispute over a contractual attor-
ney fees provision [is] entitled, not only to attorney fees on 
appeal, but also to the fees it incurred establishing the reason-
ableness of the fees for which it was entitled to be indemnified," 
Salmon, 916 P.2d at 895; James Constructors v. Salt Lake City, 888 
P.2d 665, 674 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The determinative statutes, rules and constitutional pro-
visions are set forth in the addendum where not set forth fully in 
the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The history of this relatively simple case is rather long 
and tortuous. The case began as an action based upon an alleged 
breach by Appellee and Defendant Kevin Plumb ("Plumb") of an 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement. Appellant and Plaintiff Larry R. 
Vonwald asserted in his Complaint that Plumb breached the Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement by failing to perform his obligations under 
the contract (R. 2-3) . Plumb counterclaimed against Vonwald seek-
ing return of his earnest money deposit based upon the failure of 
a condition precedent contained within the contract (R. 7-10). 
Plumb filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which motion 
was granted after a hearing on the matter (R. 28) . By Order dated 
June 8, 1994, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of 
Plumb, ordered that the earnest money deposit of $5,000.00 be 
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returned to Plumb, and awarded Plumb attorney's fees and costs in 
the amount of $4,067.90 (R. 229-32). The June 8th Order further 
provided for augmentation of Plumb's attorney's fees award for fees 
expended in collecting Plumb's judgment (R. 231). 
Vonwald subsequently appealed the June 8th Order, which 
appeal was heard by the Utah Court of Appeals as Case No. 94-731-CA 
(R. 281) . In connection with the appeal, Vonwald posted a super-
sedes bond in the amount of $5,500.00 (R. 246) . Without oral argu-
ment, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's June 8th 
Order in a Memorandum Decision dated May 25, 1995 and remanded the 
matter to the trial court for a determination of attorney's fees to 
be awarded to Plumb on appeal (R. 287-88). Vonwald then filed a 
Petition for Rehearing with the Utah Court of Appeals (R. 311-19), 
which petition was denied (R. 323). 
Vonwald then filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with 
the Utah Supreme Court (R. 320) . The Utah Supreme Court denied 
Vonwald's petition on December 5, 1995 (R. 326). Plumb then sub-
mitted a Motion for Release of Cash Bond and a Motion for Entry of 
Judgment for Attorney's Fees and Costs (R. 327-47) . In the Decem-
ber 12th, 1995 Affidavit in Support of Motion for Entry of Judgment 
for Attorney's Fees and Costs, Plumb requested an award of attor-
ney's fees and costs on appeal in the total amount of $5,475.44 (R. 
327-47). 
Thereafter, the parties entered into a Stipulation for 
Release of Cash Bond ("Stipulation") (R. 348-49) wherein the par-
ties recited that "Defendant has filed a Motion for Entry of Judg-
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ment for Attorney's Fees and Costs which is pending before this 
Court." (R. 348). The Stipulation also included the following 
paragraph: 
4. Upon the receipt of funds by Defendant's counsel as 
specified herein, Plaintiff shall be deemed to have satisfied 
all obligations in favor of the Defendant and the Order of the 
Court shall reflect the same. 
(R. 349). 
On or about January 2, 1996, the trial court entered the 
Order for Release of Cash Bond (R. 350) . Thereafter, on January 5, 
1996, Plumb filed a partial Satisfaction of Judgment, containing 
the following language: 
Nothing herein shall be construed as a Satisfaction 
of that certain Judgment in the sum of $4,064.90 rendered 
in this matter against Plaintiff Larry R. Vonwald and in 
favor of the Defendant Kevin Plumb, which Judgment was 
docketed in this Court on or about the 8th day of June, 
1994, which judgment, together with interest and costs 
remains outstanding as of this date. 
(R. 353). 
Disputing Plumb's entry of the partial Satisfaction of 
Judgment, Vonwald filed a Motion for Full Satisfaction of Judgment 
(R. 356). Plumb responded to Vonwald's motion by filing a Motion 
to Amend Order (R. 394-96) and a Memorandum in Opposition to Plain-
tiff's Motion for Full Satisfaction and to Stay Execution and in 
Support of Defendant's Motion to Amend Order (R. 397-407). 
Vonwald's Motion for Full Satisfaction of Judgment and 
Plumb's Motion to Amend Order came on for before the trial court on 
April 1, 1996. Vonwald offered absolutely no evidence either at 
the hearing or prior to the hearing in the form of affidavit testi-
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mony to contradict the facts presented by Plumb in support of 
Plumb's claims of ambiguity in the settlement agreement or mistake 
of fact (R. 356-91). From the hearing, the trial court denied 
Vonwald's Motion for Full Satisfaction of Judgment and granted 
Plumb's Motion to Amend Order (R. 443). Vonwald thereafter objec-
ted to the Proposed Order and in support of his objection, offered 
the same arguments he had advanced in support of his Motion for 
Full Satisfaction and in Opposition to Plumb's Motion to Amend (R. 
444-50). Plumb then responded to Vonwald's objection by filing a 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Objection to Proposed Order 
(R. 451-456) . 
Without the necessity of another hearing on the matter, 
the trial court entered its Order dated April 24, 1996 granting 
Plumb's Motion to Amend Order and denying Vonwald's Motion for Full 
Satisfaction of Judgment (R. 460-64). The trial court then entered 
a final Order and Judgment on May 14, 1996, in substantively the 
same form as the April 24th Order (R. 469-72). 
Vonwald thereafter filed his Notice of Appeal appealing 
from the Orders dated April 24, 1996 and May 14, 1996 (R. 475). 
The trial court ordered a cash supersedeas bond to be set by 
Vonwald in the amount of $6,700.00 relative to this appeal (R. 482-
83). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
All of the facts relevant to the determination of the 
issues presented in this appeal are set forth above in Statement of 
the Case. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Most of the claims raised by Vonwald on appeal were not 
properly preserved below, and not properly addressed on appeal 
pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Accordingly, these claims should not be considered by this Court. 
For instance, prior to this appeal, Vonwald had never raised the 
issue of whether Plumb's Motion to Amend Order conformed with the 
requirements of Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. As 
for Vonwald's Rule 60(b) issue, Vonwald has advanced on appeal no 
citation to the record and no legal analysis. Similarly, Vonwald 
has been dilatory in addressing the issues of due process and judi-
cial estoppel in his brief. Where Vonwald has raised issues for 
the first time on appeal, has failed to adequately cite to the 
record, and has advanced no significant legal analysis, this Court 
should presume the correctness of the trial court's decision. 
With regard to Vonwald's challenge to the reasonableness 
of the attorney's fees awarded to Plumb, Plumb asserts that this 
claim constitutes a violation of Rule 40 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Vonwald never challenged the reasonableness 
of the attorney's fees to the trial court. In fact, the evidence 
before the trial court indicated that Vonwald had agreed to the 
amount of attorney's fees sought by and awarded to Plumb. To now 
challenge on appeal the reasonableness of the attorney's fees 
awarded to Plumb is utterly frivolous. Consequently, this Court 
should sanction Vonwald pursuant to Rule 40 for pursuing this 
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frivolous claim by imposing an award to Plumb of his attorney's 
fees incurred in defending against this appeal. 
The only remaining issue advanced by Vonwald on appeal is 
his claim that the Stipulation between the parties was not ambig-
uous. The evidence presented to the trial court does not support 
Vonwald's assertions on appeal. The language of the Stipulation 
was ambiguous as the trial court correctly determined. Moreover, 
the ambiguity of the Stipulation was not the only grounds upon 
which the trial court granted Plumb's Motion to Amend Order. The 
trial court also correctly determined that the January 1996 Order 
should be reformed on the basis of mistake of fact. Accordingly, 
independent grounds exist for this Court's affirmation of the trial 
court's May 14, 1996 Order amending the January 1996 Order. 
Lastly, Plumb is entitled to an award of his attorney's 
fees incurred in defending against this latest appeal. This enti-
tlement is based upon (i) the language of the Earnest Money Pur-
chase Agreement between the parties as well as (ii) Vonwald's vio-
lation of Rule 40 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accor-
dingly, Plumb requests that this court remand the issue of Plumb's 
attorney's fees on this appeal to the trial court for determina-
tion. 
ARGUMENT 
Vonwald's Brief of Appellant appears to present a myriad 
of issues for this Court's consideration on appeal, most of which 
merit little if any attention. Moreover, none of the issues pre-
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sented by Vonwald bear upon the ultimate issue of whether the trial 
court correctly entered its Order dated May 14, 1996. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ENTERED 
ITS ORDER DATED MAY 14, 1996. 
In his appellate brief, Vonwald advances five arguments 
in support of his claim that the trial court erred in entering its 
Order dated May 14, 1996: (i) that the Stipulation between the 
parties was not ambiguous, and therefore must be enforced; (ii) 
that Plumb's Motion to Amend Order was not in conformity with Rule 
9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; (iii) that Plumb's Motion 
to Amend Order was not proper under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure; and (iv) that the May 14, 1996 Order amounts to an 
impermissible taking without due process of law. Only the first of 
these five arguments warrants analysis by this Court. Accordingly, 
Plumb will first dispose of the four frivolous claims prior to 
addressing the question of whether the Stipulation between the 
parties was ambiguous. 
A. Vonwald's Claim That Plumb's Motion to Amend Order Failed 
to Conform With Rule 9 (b) Was Not Properly Preserved, And 
Therefore Was Waived on Appeal. 
In Vonwald's Brief of the Appellant, Vonwald seems to 
claim that Plumb's Motion to Amend Order was insufficient as a mat-
ter of law pursuant to Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(Brief of Appellant at 9-10) . However, Vonwald made no such objec-
tion to Plumb's Motion to Amend Order prior to the hearing on 
Plumb's motion. Indeed, Vonwald did not raise the alleged Rule 9 
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violation in Vonwald's Objection to Motion to Amend Order (R. 427-
38) or at the hearing on the matter. Instead, Vonwald first raised 
the alleged Rule 9 violation in Vonwald's Objection to Proposed 
Order filed after the hearing on the matter (R. 444-50). Vonwald 
waived any claim for an alleged Rule 9 violation by failing to 
properly raise the claim before the trial court prior to the hear-
ing on the matter; and this Court should now abstain from address-
ing this claim due to Vonwald's failure to properly raise it. 
American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah 1984) (argument 
offered in defense of decision below had been waived when not 
raised below). 
Moreover, the evidence presented to the trial court was 
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule 9. Plumb did state 
the circumstances constituting the mistake in the Affidavit of 
Dennis K. Poole dated January 26, 1996 which was filed contempora-
neously with Plumb's Motion to Amend Order (R. 408-13). This affi-
davit amply set forth the circumstances constituting the mistake 
for which Plumb sought reformation of the Order. Clearly, there 
was no violation of Rule 9 in Plumb's Motion to Amend Order. 
Vonwald's claim to the contrary is entirely meritless.1 
1
 Vonwald's brief also failed to set forth any authority for 
the proposition that Rule 9 has any application whatsoever to a 
motion brought pursuant to Rule 60 to amend an order. 
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B. Vonwald's Brief on Appeal Fails to Adequately 
Articulate a Rule 60(b) Violation, and Should 
be Disregarded by this Court. 
One can surmise, based upon Paragraph C of Vonwald's Sum-
mary of the Argument, that Vonwald intended, on appeal, to raise as 
an issue that Plumb's Motion to Amend Order did not comply with 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Brief of Appellant 
at 10).2 However, in the argument section of Vonwald's brief, 
Vonwald failed to cite to where, in the record, this issue had been 
preserved for appeal. Moreover, Vonwald did not even mention this 
issue in the Argument and Authority section of Vonwald's brief 
(Brief of Appellant at 10-15). Where Vonwald (i) set forth no 
legal analysis of this claim, (ii) has not set forth how Plumb 
failed to comply with Rule 60(b), (iii) failed to marshal any evi-
dence, and (iv) failed to cite to the record, this Court should 
decline to consider the merits of Vonwald's claim. Phillips v. 
Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108, 1109 (Utah App. 1995); see also Koulis v. 
Standard Oil of Cal., 746 P.2d 1182, 1185 (Utah App. 1987) (refusing 
to consider brief that failed to contain record citations and that 
did not conform to Rule 24 requirements for argument section of 
brief); First Sec. Bank of Utah v. Creech, 858 P.2d 958, 962 (Utah 
1993) (refusing to address contention in brief that did not conform 
to requirements of Rule 24(a)(9)); Steele v. Board of Review, 845 
2Vonwald lists the following argument in his Summary of 
Arguments: "A motion for relief under URCiP 60(b) to be valid 
requires a showing of exceptional circumstances and cannot be used 
to relieve a litigant or his counsel from the consequences of his 
decisions." (Brief of Appellant at 10). 
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P.2d 960, 961-962 (Utah App. 1993) (striking brief which did not 
comply with requirements of Rule 24(a)(7) and 24(a)(9)). 
C. Vonwald's Due Process and Judicial Estoppel 
Claims Should Likewise be Disregarded by This 
Court. 
Vonwald's appellate brief also sets forth claims that (i) 
the Court's amendment of its prior order constitutes a "taking" 
without due process of law; and (ii) the principle of judicial 
estoppel prevented Plumb's requested relief (Brief of Appellant at 
10-15) . Again, Vonwald has completely failed to cite to the record 
to demonstrate that either of these claims had been properly pre-
served for trial. Moreover, Vonwald's legal analysis of these 
claims is sorely lacking. For instance, with regard to Vonwald's 
due process claim, Vonwald fails to cite to a single case to sup-
port his contention, and in fact, acknowledges that fl[t]here prob-
ably is no precedent declaring the rights and liabilities of the 
parties under such circumstances." (Brief of Appellant at 12-13). 
As for Vonwald's judicial estoppel claim, Vonwald has 
failed to provide any legal analysis or argument (Brief of Appel-
lant at 15). Clearly Vonwald's appellate brief fails to comport 
with the requirements of Rule 24(a) (9) of the Utah Rules of Appel-
late Procedure.3 As such, this Court should decline to address the 
3Rule 24(a)(9) states: "The argument shall contain the con-
tentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not pre-
served in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, 
statutes, and parts of the record relied on. U.R.App.P. 24(a) (9) 
(1996) . 
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issues of due process and judicial estoppel and "assume the cor-
rectness of the trial court's judgment below.11 Barney v. Utah 
Dept. of Commerce, 885 P.2d 809, 810 (Utah App. 1994). 
D. Vonwald's Challenge to the Reasonableness of 
Plumb's Attorney's Fees Constitutes Bad Faith 
and Should be Disregarded by This Court. 
Although not specifically designated as an issue on 
appeal, Vonwald begins the Argument Section of his appellate brief 
with a challenge to the reasonableness of the attorney's fees 
claimed by Plumb in defending against Vonwald's first appeal (Brief 
of Appellant at 10-12). The reasonableness of the attorney's fees 
claimed by Plumb was never at issue before the trial court. In 
fact, as set forth in the Affidavit of Dennis K. Poole (R. 408-13) , 
Vonwald and Plumb came to an agreement regarding the attorney's 
fees claimed by Plumb (R. 410). Vonwald's acceptance of Plumb's 
attorney's fees on appeal is also reflected in the Stipulation 
itself (R.348-49). 
It is disingenuous at best for Vonwald to now challenge 
the reasonableness of Plumb's attorney's fees on appeal when 
Vonwald never raised the issue of reasonableness below but rather 
agreed and stipulated to payment of such fees. Vonwald's conduct 
in bringing this meritless claim is consistent with Vonwald's 
efforts, all along, to stall and avoid paying his obligation in 
this matter. 
This conduct moreover constitutes a violation of Rules 33 
and 40(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Vonwald and 
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his attorney should be sanctioned pursuant to Rules 33 and 40(b) 
for needlessly adding to the cost of this litigation by offering 
spurious claims as grounds for their appeal. Vonwald's appeal is 
frivolous and "not warranted in law". As damages under Rule 33, 
Plumb is "entitled to an award of double costs and reasonable 
compensation and labor [he has] expended defending against the 
appeal", DeBry v Cascade Enterprises, 310 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 9 
(Utah, filed Feb. 7, 1997) (emphasis added). Accordingly, Plumb 
requests that this Court sanction Vonwald and his attorney by 
imposing a fine including Plumb's attorney's fees incurred in 
defending against this appeal. 
E. The Trial Court Correctly Granted Plumb's 
Motion to Amend Order. 
The only argument contained in Vonwald's appellate brief 
which has been properly preserved and raised before this Court is 
his claim that the Stipulation was unambiguous (Brief of Appellant 
at 9, 13-14) . However, even this claim lacks merit. Plumb brought 
his Motion to Amend Order on three grounds: (i) lack of consider-
ation for a release of the June 1994 Judgment (R. 402-03); (ii) 
ambiguity in the language of the Stipulation (R. 403); and (iii) 
mistake of fact (R. 403-05). The trial court's final Order of May 
14, 1996 clearly set forth that Plumb was entitled to an amendment 
to the January 2, 1996 Order based upon both (i) the ambiguity in 
the language of the Stipulation; and (ii) mistake of fact (R. 470) . 
Vonwald has completely failed to raise and address the grounds of 
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mistake of fact which also supported the trial court's May 14, 1996 
Order. 
With regard to the issue of ambiguity, the ambiguity 
arose in conflicting language contained in the Stipulation of the 
parties dated January 2, 1996 (R. 348-49). Paragraph 1 of the 
Stipulation states: 
1. That Defendant has filed a Motion for 
Entry of Judgment for Attorney's Fees and 
Costs which is pending before this Court. 
(R. 348) . This paragraph clearly refers to the motion by Plumb for 
and award of the additional attorney's fees he incurred in defen-
ding against Vonwald's first appeal. The Stipulation makes no men-
tion of Plumb's prior judgment for attorney's fees in the amount of 
$4,067.90 incurred prior to the appeal. Paragraph 4 of the Stipu-
lation then reads: 
4. Upon the receipt of funds by Defendant's 
counsel as specified herein, Plaintiff shall be deemed to 
have satisfied all obligations in favor of the Defendant 
and the Order of the Court shall reflect the same. 
(R. 349) . The ambiguity arises when these paragraphs are read 
together. Since the Stipulation clearly addressed only the issue 
of Plumb's attorney's fees on appeal, did paragraph 4 of the 
Stipulation also only refer to Vonwald's (Plaintiff's) obligation 
for the attorney's fees incurred on appeal? 
The effect of the January 2, 1996 Order was to award 
Plumb a judgment of $5,315.44 for Plumb's attorney's fees on appeal 
(apart from his attorney's fees below). It was therefore logical 
and appropriate that Vonwald should have been required to provide 
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a satisfaction of judgment for the amount of attorney's fees on 
appeal upon receipt of the same; then and only then would there be 
evidence of satisfaction of the Court's order. 
To resolve the ambiguity in the language of the Stipula-
tion, the trial court properly looked at the intent of the parties 
in entering into the Stipulation. "[W]hen a contract provision is 
ambiguous because it is susceptible to more than one reasonable 
interpretation due to uncertain meaning of terms, missing terms, or 
other facial deficiencies, extrinsic evidence is admissible to 
explain the intent of the parties.fl Willard Pease Oil & Gas Co. v. 
Pioneer Oil & Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1995); Faulkner v. 
Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983). 
In support of Plumb's Motion to Amend Order, Plumb pre-
sented the Affidavit of Dennis K. Poole dated January 26, 1996 
wherein evidence was presented to the trial court supporting 
Plumb's motion (R. 408-13). This evidence went wholly undisputed 
by Vonwald before the trial court! Since the undisputed evidence 
presented to the trial court clearly supported Plumb's motion, the 
trial court did not err in granting the same. Therefore, where the 
extrinsic evidence regarding the intent of the parties supported 
Plumb's motion to amend, the trial court's Order dated May 14, 1996 
should be upheld by this Court. Willard Pease, 899 P.2d at 770; 
see also Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552, 559 (Utah App. 1994). 
Vonwald's attack on the issue of whether an ambiguity 
existed in the Stipulation ignores the other grounds for which the 
trial court amended the prior Order: mistake of fact. The 
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Affidavit of Dennis K. Poole dated January 26, 1996 also presented 
evidence to support Plumb's claim for mistake of fact (R. 408-13) . 
Moreover, Plumb argued, in his Memorandum in Support of Defendant's 
Motion to Amend Order, that the January 1996 Order was the product 
of either a mutual mistake of fact or a unilateral mistake of fact 
known to Vonwald (R. 403-05). This mistake of fact went unchal-
lenged by Vonwald both before the trial court and on appeal. 
Since Vonwald has not raised as an issue of appeal the 
question of whether the trial court correctly amended the January 
1996 Order on the basis of mistake of fact, this Court must assume 
the correctness of the trial court's ruling. Moreover, since the 
trial court had an independent basis for granting Plumb's Motion to 
Amend Order--mistake of fact--the correctness of the trial court's 
ruling with regard to the issue of ambiguity is largely moot. 
Plumb was entitled to reformation of the January 1996 Order based 
upon mistake of fact. Accordingly, even if this Court determines 
that the trial court incorrectly determined there to be an ambig-
uity in the Stipulation as a matter of law, this Court should none-
theless affirm the trial court's May 14, 1996 Order on the basis of 
mistake of fact. 
II. APPELLEE PLUMB IS ENTITLED TO AN 
AWARD OF HIS ATTORNEY'S FEES 
INCURRED IN DEFENDING AGAINST THIS 
APPEAL. 
Plumb requests an award of attorneys fees in defending 
this appeal. The Earnest Money Sales Agreement signed between the 
parties allowed for the recovery of attorney's fees as follows: 
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Both parties agree that should either party default in 
any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the 
defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, in-
cluding a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or 
accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in 
pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by applicable 
law, whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or 
otherwise. 
(R. 42) Plumb incurred attorneys fees in defending Vonwald's Com-
plaint. Based upon Section N of the Agreement, the District Court 
granted Plumb an award of attorneys fees in its Order dated June 8, 
1994 (R. 229-32). Likewise, the Utah Court of Appeals granted 
Plumb his attorney's fees on Vonwald's first appeal (R. 283-84). 
This Court has recognized "that a contractual obligation 
to pay attorney fees incurred in enforcing a contract should also 
include fees incurred on appeal.11 Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 
890, 896 (Utah 1996) . Moreover, "the prevailing party in a dispute 
over a contractual attorney fees provision [is] entitled, not only 
to attorney fees on appeal, but also to the fees it incurred estab-
lishing the reasonableness of the fees for which it was entitled to 
be indemnified." Salmon, 916 P.2d at 895; James Constructors v. 
Salt Lake City, 888 P.2d 665, 674 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Just as 
Plumb was entitled to his attorney's fees for the first appeal, he 
is likewise entitled to his attorney's fees in defending against 
this appeal. 
Plumb is further entitled to an award of attorney's fees 
based upon Vonwald's violations of Rules 33(b) and 40 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. As deficient and spurious as 
Vonwald's brief is, Plumb has been required nonetheless to undergo 
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the expense of answering it. Accordingly, Plumb also requests an 
award of double attorney's fees on this appeal pursuant to Rule 
33(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and requests that 
this court remand the issue of Plumb's attorney's fees on this 
appeal to the trial court for determination. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant/Appellee Plumb re-
spectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial court's Order 
dated May 14, 1996 and award Plumb his attorney's fees incurred in 
defending against this appeal. 
DATED this sp^7 <^ ay of^F^ruary, 19j^ 
DENNIS K. POOLE 
ANDREA NUFFER GODFREY 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C, 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant Kevin Plumb 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the 
above and foregoing Brief of Appellee in Appeal No. 960254 were 
mailed, United States Mail, postage prepaid, the ^ 7 day of 
February, 1997, to the following: 
Larry L. Whyte, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Appellant — 
265 East 100 South, jfuite^OO 
Salt Lake City, Utah\8411l\ 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Order dated June 8, 1994 (R. 229-31) 
2. Memorandum Decision dated May 25, 1995 (R. 287-88) 
3. Motion for Entry of Judgment for Attorney's Fees and Costs 
dated Aug. 1, 1995 (R. 289-291) 
4. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Entry of Judgment for 
Attorney's Fees and Costs dated Aug. 1, 1995 (R. 292-295) 
5. Affidavit in Support of Motion for Entry of Judgment for 
Attorney's Fees and Costs dated Aug. 1, 1995 (R. 296-302) 
6. Motion for Release of Cash Bond dated Aug. 1, 1995 (R. 303-04) 
7. Affidavit of Dennis K. Poole dated Aug. 1, 1995 (R. 305-07) 
8. Stipulation for Release of Cash Bond dated January 2, 1996 (R. 
348-49) 
9. Order for Release of Cash Bond dated January 2, 1996 (R. 350-
51) 
10. Motion to Amend Order (R. 394-96) 
11. Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Full 
Satisfaction and to Stay Execution and in Support of Defen-
dant's Motion to Amend Order (R. 397-407) 
12. Affidavit of Dennis K. Poole dated Jan. 26, 1996 (R. 408-13) 
13. Minute Entry dated April 1, 1996 (R. 443) 
14. Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Objection to Proposed 
Order dated April 13, 1996 (R. 451-456) 
15. Order dated April 24, 1996 (R. 460-64) 
16. Order for Supersedeas Bond and Stay of Proceedings dated Sept. 
18, 1996 
17. Rule 9, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
18. Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
19. Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
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20. Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
21. Rule 40, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
22. Section 78-2-2 (3) (j), Utah Code Ann. (1996) 
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DENNIS K. POOLE [2625] 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 263-3344 
JUN 8 
By 
/ / SALT L/VKZ' OOijh '"/ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY R. VONWALD, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
KEVIN PLUMB, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
CASE NO. 930905795 
JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
PLAINTIFFfS OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEYS FEES having 
come on for hearing before the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki on the 
26th day of May, 1994, and the Defendant appearing by and through 
his attorney Dennis K. Poole and the Plaintiff neither appearing 
in person or by counsel, and the Court having considered the 
affidavits, pleadings and objections for and against an award of 
such fees, including an objection filed by Plaintiff immediately 
prior to said hearing, and the court having taken the sworn 
testimony of Dennis K. Poole and having considered the same, and 
now desiring to enter an Order with respect to attorney's fees and 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment which was heard on the 24th 
day of March, 1994, and the Court having determined that there are 
no genuine issues of material fact, 
00229 
ENTERS THE FOLLOWING FINDINGS, ORDERS AND JUDGMENT: 
1. Paragraph 7 of the Earnest Money Agreement is clear and 
unambiguous and contains conditions precedent which were not 
fulfilled, rendering closing of the contract unenforceable. 
2. Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant Kevin Plumb is 
entitled to Summary Judgment against the Plaintiff Larry R. 
Vonwald, requiring the return by the Broker of the Earnest Money 
Deposit in the sum of $5,000 made by said Defendant pursuant to the 
terms and conditions of the Earnest Money Agreement dated August 
10, 1993. 
3. Defendant is entitled to a judgment for its attorney's 
fees and costs as follows: 
Fees Dennis K, Poole Andrea Nuffer 
October, 1993 $ 120.00 $ -0-
November, 1993 $ 315.00 $ 207.00 
December, 1993 $ -0- $ 828.00 
January, 1994 $ 300.00 $ 360.00 
February, 1994 $ 225.00 $ 261.00 
March, 1994 $ 525.00 $ 310.00 
April & May, 1994 $ Combined: $450.00 
TOTAL ATTORNEYS1 FEES: $3,901.00 
Costs: 
Filing fee - Crossclaim $ 60.00 
Datashare Computer Research $103.90 
TOTAL COSTS $163.90 
Such costs and fees are determined to be reasonable and necessary. 
00230 
4. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to 
the allegations of fraud asserted by the Plaintiff are treated as 
a motion for dismissal and the same is hereby granted as a result 
of the Plaintiff's failure to plead the same with particularity. 
5. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment to dismiss 
Defendant's claims and for attorney's fees is denied as a result 
of the orders and judgments in favor of the Defendant as set forth 
above. 
6. It is further ordered that the judgment in favor of 
Plaintiff shall be augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and 
attorney's fees expended in collecting said judgment by execution 
or otherwise, as shall be established by affidavit. 
7. The total judgment of $4,064.90 against the Plaintiff 
shall hereafter bear interest at the rate of 5.61% per annum until 
p a i d
- * * & 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT dated this £/ day of June, 1994. 
BY THE CC 
GLENN K. I W A S A K I / 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
plumb3.ord ( s c h d i r ) 
00231 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER in Civil No. 930905795 to the 
following: 
Larry R. Vonwald, Pro Se 
2535 East Chalet Road 
Sandy, Utah 84093 
and by depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage 
prepaid thereon, in the United States Mails at Salt Lake City, Utah 
thisfrxfoltil day of June, 1994. 
Susan C. Held 
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FILED 
MAY 2 51995 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Larry N. Vonwald, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Kevin Plumb, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
COURT OF APPEALS 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 940731-CA 
F I L E D 
(May 25, 1995) 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Attorneys:, Larry L. Whyte, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Dennis K. Poole and Andrea Nuffer, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee 
Before Judges Orme, Davis, and Jackson. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Larry R. Vonwald appeals the trial court's grant of Kevin 
Plumb's motion for summary judgment. We affirm.1 
Both parties contend that the language contained in 
paragraph 7 of their Earnest Money Sales Agreement is 
unambiguous. We agree that the language is unambiguous and 
conclude that it creates a condition precedent which failed due 
to Plumb's inability to gain county approval of his plans. 
We have reviewed Vonwald's claims that Plumb breached a 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, committed fraud, and 
violated Rule 11. We find these claims to be without merit. See 
State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888-89 (Utah 1989) (stating court 
may decline to address arguments without merit on appeal). 
1. We have determined that M[t]he facts and legal arguments are 
adequately presented in the briefs and record and the decisional 
process would not be significantly aided by oral argument." Utah 
R. App. P. 2 9(a) (3) . 
*<tW 
A contractual provision for payment of attorney fees 
includes attorney fees incurred by the prevailing party on appeal 
as well as at trial. Management Servs. Corp. v. Development 
Assocs., 617 P.2d 406, 409 (Utah 1980). Inasmuch as Plumb 
prevailed, we remand to the district court for determination of 
attorney fees to be awarded to Plumb on appeal. 
Norman H. Jacksoai, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
i, the undersigned, Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals, dc 
hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and corred 
copy of an original document on file in the Utah Court oi 
Appeals. In testjmony whereof, I have set my hand and 
affixed the seal' '" ~ 
A J ^I.^IM^V 
Marilyn IM. Branch 
Clerk^f the Court 
By^Y^.fr/7^ , cf/cj^r 
Deputy Clerk ^<^ 
->-rJi,-<if 
J a m e s / 2 / D a v i s , 
A s s o c i a t e P r e s i d i n g J u d g e 
Date 
9 4 0 7 3 1 - C A 2 
DENNIS K. POOLE (2625) 
ANDREA NUFFER (6623) 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 263-3344 
Telefax: (801) 263-1010 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY R. VONWALD, : MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
Plaintiff, : 
-vs- : CIVIL NO. 930905795 
KEVIN PLUMB, : JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Defendant. : 
Comes now the Defendant and pursuant to the Memorandum 
Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals and the Remittitur by the 
Utah Court of Appeals, respectfully moves this Court for Judgment 
against the Plaintiff for: (i) Defendant's attorney's fees on 
appeal; (ii) for Defendant's costs incurred in connection with the 
appeal; and (iii) Defendant's attorney's fees in bringing this 
Motion. This Motion is supported by the Affidavit of Dennis K. 
m 0 3 W5 
plumvon tn4 i (d>p) 
0*0-0'?. ^ 
Poole in Support of Motion for Entry of Judgment, and the Memoran-
dum of Points and Authorities submitted concurrently herewith. 
DATED this day of August/\199 5 . 
J&'Tl'YU o ff 
DENNIS K. POOLE 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
plumvon m4i (dVp) 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR JUDGMENT in Case No. 
930905795 to the following: 
Larry R. Vonwald, Pro Se 
2535 East Chalet Road 
Sandy, Utah 84093 
Larry L. Whyte, Esq. 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and by depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage 
prepaid thereon, in the United States Mails at Salt Lake City, Utah 
this Lot 
day of August, 199 5. 
V//.M?\ 
/ 
Susan C. Held 
plumvon m4} (d^p) 
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DENNIS K. POOLE (2625) 
ANDREA NUFFER (6623) 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 263-3344 
Telefax: (801) 263-1010 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third J^^'^ip' restrict 
AUG 0 3 1995 
By A %r.ii[C>'-
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY R. VONWALD, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
KEVIN PLUMB, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
CIVIL NO. 930905795 
JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Defendant respectfully submits this Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Entry of Judgment for Attorney's Fees and Costs based 
upon the Memorandum Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals, and the 
Earnest Money Agreement which is the subject of this action. 
FACTS 
This matter came before this Court (the Honorable Glenn K. 
Iwasaki) for hearing on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
the 24th day of March, 1994, and thereafter on Defendant's Motion 
for Attorney's Fees. The Court granted Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims and awarding 
Defendant attorney's fees and costs. Plaintiff subsequently filed 
a Notice of Appeal from the Judgment and Order of this Court 
regarding said Motions. 
On May 25, 1995, the Court of Appeals issued its Memorandum 
Decision affirming the Judgment and Order of this Court with 
respect to the dismissal of Plaintiff's claims. The Court of 
Appeals, in its Memorandum Decision, also found that Defendant and 
Appellee was entitled to attorney's fees incurred on appeal. 
The Utah Court of Appeals remanded the matter to this Court 
for consideration of an award of such fees and costs and a Remitti-
tur was filed on July 20, 1995. 
ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals of Utah, in the case of Leon H. Saunders, 
et al vs John C. Sharp and Geraldine Y. Sharp, upon remand by the 
Utah Supreme Court, states as follows: 
While courts may, in some situations, award attorney 
fees on an equitable basis, "attorneys fees, when awarded 
as allowed by law, are awarded as a matter of legal 
right." Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 
1985). 
One such instance occurs when the right is contrac-
tual. In such cases, "'the court does not possess the 
same equitable discretion to deny attorney's fees that it 
has when fashioning equitable remedies, or applying a 
statute which allows the discretionary award of such 
fees.'" Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah App. 
1989) (quoting Spinks v. Chevron Oil Co., 507 F.2d 216, 
226 (5th Cir. 1975)) . 
plumvon n«it (dVp) 2 
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Thus, "provisions in written contracts providing for 
payment of attorney fees should ordinarily be honored by 
the courts." Stacey Properties v. Wixen, 766 P.2d 1080, 
1085 (Utah App. 1988), cert, denied, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 
1989) (quoting Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d 1082, 1085 (Utah 
1983)). . . . 
Saunders v. Sharp, 840 P.2d 796 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Defendant, 
therefore, is entitled to recover his reasonable attorney's fees, 
legal expenses and costs incurred in connection with the appeal and 
in bringing the current Motion. Accordingly, Defendant requests 
that this Court enter judgment in favor of Defendant in the amount 
of these fees and costs as more particularly set forth in the 
Affidavit in Support of Motion for Entry of Judgment for Attorney's 
Fees and Costs filed simultaneously herewith. Defendant reserves 
the right to supplement his request for fees and costs for 
additional costs incurred in pursuing the current Motion. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant respectfully requests 
that this Court grant Defendant's Motion for Entry of Judgment for 
Attorney's Fees and Costs. 
DATED this / day of August, 199 5. 
^7?><? 
DENNIS K. POOLE 
ANDREA NUFFER 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS in Case No. 
930905795 to the following: 
Larry R. Vonwald, Pro Se 
2535 East Chalet Road 
Sandy, Utah 84093 
Larry L. Whyte, Esq. 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and by depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage 
prepaid thereon, in the United States Mails at Salt Lake City, Utah 
this LOZ. day of August, 1995 
(//&?/? \ 
Susan C. Held 
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DENNIS K. POOLE (2625) 
ANDREA NUFFER (6623) 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 263-3344 
Telefax: (801) 263-1010 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY R. VONWALD, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
KEVIN PLUMB, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
CIVIL NO. 930905795 
JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
DENNIS K. POOLE, being first duly sworn, upon oath, deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. I am an attorney at law duly licensed to practice law in 
the State of Utah, and represent the Defendant with respect to the 
above entitled action. 
2. I am familiar with collection procedures, cases and law 
generally in the State of Utah and am familiar with the papers and 
pleadings filed in the above-entitled action. 
plumvon.fal (dkp) 
3. Summary Judgment was entered in favor of Defendant in 
this matter, in part awarding Defendant his attorney's fees and 
costs incurred in this matter. Plaintiff appealed the order and 
judgment. 
4. On May 25, 1995, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its 
Memorandum Opinion affirming the grant of Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and a Remittitur was filed on June 20, 1995. 
5. In addition, the Appeals Court found that Defendant was 
entitled to an award of attorney's fees incurred by Defendant on 
appeal. 
6. The following is a summary of the services, attorney's 
fees, and time spent by Defendant's counsel in connection with 
collection efforts, the Appeal and this Motion: 
DATE 
July 1994 
August 19 94 
DESCRIPTION OF SERVICES 
Telephone conferences with clients 
re: notice of appeal and draft let-
ter; research re: motor vehicles, 
business filings, UCC filings, 
corporate interests and real proper-
ty interests of Plaintiff for execu-
tion; review notice from Supreme 
Court, prepare application for and 
garnishments and related pleadings. 
DKP .5 hours 
EC (paralegal) 16.8 hours 
Review Docketing Statement and re-
view of Rules for Summary 
Disposition. Review Vonwald's Mo-
tion for Summary Disposition and 
AMOUNT 
$ 915.00 
p'u"Min I af (dkp) 
rules; research regarding reply to 
Motion for Summary Disposition; 
draft and edit reply to Motion for 
Summary Disposition; conf. with 
Constable re: execution sale; draft 
letter to Plaintiff re: posting of 
bond and stay of execution; conf. 
with Judge re: setting bond on ap-
peal 
DKP 
EC (paralegal) 
AN (associate) 
2.4 hours 
1.1 hours 
7.8 hours 
1,117.00 
October 1994 Review trial transcript and appel-
late brief 
AN (associate) 1.05 hours 
115.50 
November 1994 Obtain and review record; draft 
appellate brief, deliver to printer 
and return record to District Court 
DKP 
EC (paralegal) 
AN (associate) 
.8 hours 
2.0 hours 
8.9 hours 
December 1994 Review notice from court of Appeals 
and rules of appellate procedure, 
review notice of pour over from 
Supreme Court, review reply brief. 
1,207.00 
May 199 5 
DKP 
AN (associate) 
.6 hours 
.05 hours 
Review decision from Court of Ap-
peals, draft letter to client 
101.50 
DKP . 3 hours 
48.00 
pluimon faf <dVp) 
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June 199 5 Review Petition for Rehearing, rules 
of Appellate procedure, draft letter 
to client 
DKP .4 hours 
AN (associate) .2 hours 
July 1995 Review Remittitur and Draft Motion 
for attorney's fees and costs, draft 
Affidavit and Memorandum; draft 
Motion for Release of Bond 
DKP 3.0 hours 
August 1995 Estimated for review of responsive 
Memo and attendance at hearing and 
preparation of Order 
DKP 2.0 hours 
86.00 
480.00 
320.00 
TOTAL FEES $ 4,39 0.00 
The following is a breakdown of the time spent by the indivi 
dual members of the firm with their hourly billing rates: 
Dennis K. Poole, Senior Partner, 2.90 hrs 
@ $150.00 per hour $ 435.00 
7.10 hrs @ $160.00 per hour $ 1,136.00 
Andrea Nuffer, Associate Attorney, 7.80 
hrs @ $90.00 per hour 702.00 
10.20 hrs @ $110.00 per hour 1,122.00 
Elaine Colby, Paralegal, 19.90 hrs @ $50.00 
per hour 995.00 
Total Fees $ 4,390.00 
plimivon.faf (dXp) 
•ft.-(lfi*>S-G 
7. The fees charged are reasonable and are comparable to the 
hourly rates charged by other law firms in the area for the same 
type of services. 
8. The following is an itemization of the costs expended in 
collection efforts and on the Appeal: 
Collection: 
7/28/94 Garnishee Fee $ 10.00 
7/28/94 Filing Fee for Garnishment and Exec 10.00 
8/22/94 Motor Vehicle Search Cost 2.00 
10/19/94 Compute research (county records) 85.87 
TOTAL COLLECTION COSTS TO DATE $ 107.87 
Appeal: 
8/18/94 Copy costs for Transcript 22.25 
11/14/94 Copy costs of briefs 97.08 
TOTAL COSTS ON APPEAL $ 119.33 
9. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of the attorney's fees 
and costs itemized above pursuant to the Earnest Money Receipt upon 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
plumvon f»f IdVp) 
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which this action is based and the Memorandum Decision of the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
DATED this / day of August, 1995 
'' "7>^L. 
DENNIS K. POOLE 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
ACKNOWLEDGED before me this 
DENNIS K. POOLE. 
My Commission Expires: 
/5 . • / - day of August, 19 9 5 by 
C^a'c~t.*\ 
NOTARY PUBLIC / / 
Residing in Sait Lake, Utah 
i Jti^Sth*. Notary Public ~" *~ ** 
I ^ S f t t t S l k _ ELAINE COLBY | 
• fffffiSSato i 5 4 ^ South 700 East #200 J 
i til (TOOTf M S*11 Lake Cjt* Utah 34107 ! 
! y&JK&ttJjff My Commission Expires 1 
' N S W 2 ^ Ww* 26. 199» I 
l~*Tt2?zC«.*- Stat&ofUtah • 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS in Case No. 
930905795 to the following: 
Larry R. Vonwald, Pro Se 
2535 East Chalet Road 
Sandy, Utah 84093 
Larry L. Whyte, Esq. 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and by depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage 
prepaid thereon, in the United States Mails at Salt Lake City, Utah 
this /y~t day of August, 1995 
Susan C. Held 
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DENNIS K. POOLE (2625) 
ANDREA NUFFER (6623) 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 263-3344 
Telefax: (801) 263-1010 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY R. VONWALD, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
KEVIN PLUMB, 
Defendant. 
MOTION FOR RELEASE OF 
CASH BOND 
CIVIL NO. 930905795 
JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
THE DEFENDANT KEVIN PLUMB, by and through his attorney Dennis 
K. Poole, respectfully moves the Court for an order releasing the 
Plaintiff's cash supersedeas bond in the sum of $5,500. This 
Motion is supported by the Affidavit of Dennis K. Poole filed 
contemporaneously herewith. 
DATED this tit., day of August 199 5 
c£<n-
DENNIS K. POOLE 
ANDREA NUFFER 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR RELEASE OF CASH BOND in 
Case No. 930905795 to the following: 
Larry R. Vonwald, Pro Se 
2535 East Chalet Road 
Sandy, Utah 84093 
Larry L. Whyte, Esq. 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and by depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage 
prepaid thereon, in the United States Mails at Salt Lake City, Utah 
this Lot. 
day of August, 199 5. 
Y/.M)\ 
Susan C. Held' 
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DENNIS K. POOLE (2625) 
ANDREA NUFFER (6623) 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 263-3344 
Telefax: (801) 263-1010 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY R. VONWALD, : AFFIDAVIT OF 
DENNIS K. POOLE 
Plaintiff, : 
-vs- : CIVIL NO. 930905795 
KEVIN PLUMB, : JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Defendant. : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
DENNIS K. POOLE, being first duly sworn, upon oath, deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. I am the attorney for the Defendant in the above-entitled 
action. 
2. Defendant prevailed on a Motion for Summary Judgment on 
the 24th day of March, 1994, and thereafter was awarded attorney's 
fees. 
p]umvon.nC( (dVp) 
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3. The Plaintiff in the above-entitled action filed a Notice 
of Appeal from the Judgment and Order of this Court. 
4. On the 30th day of August, 1994, the Honorable Glenn K. 
Iwasaki entered an order approving a cash supersedeas bond in the 
sum of $5,500, which bond in whole or in part has been tendered and 
posted by the Plaintiff. 
5. On May 25, 1995, the Court of Appeals issued its 
memorandum decision affirming the Judgment and Order in favor of 
the Defendant and further found that the Defendant was entitled to 
his attorney's fees and costs incurred on appeal. 
6. The Defendant has also incurred attorney's fees and costs 
relative to its attempts to collect the Judgment which are more 
particularly set forth in an Affidavit of Affiant in support of 
Motion for Attorney's Fees filed contemporaneously herewith. 
7. Defendant Kevin Plumb has not collected any sums or 
amounts due upon the Judgment and is entitled to an order of the 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
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Court releasing the cash bond to him for application against the 
Judgment and amounts due him. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
DATED this / day of August, 1995. 
-&?n<~> /' ^ 
DENNIS K. POOLE 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
ACKNOWLEDGED before me this A / day of August, 19 9 5 by 
DENNIS K. POOLE. ' - ,,' 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC ~7 
Residing in Salt Lake, Utah 
Notary Public 
=LAIM* CO! ?• V T ELAIM5 COt^Y | 
4543 Sou:', / "- , t ?;"?) I 
Sc!t Ukc 0. :..:107 ! 
My Cr-mm:^;:.-: .;;-.piro3 • 
March 23, 1a 33 I 
State of Utah i 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS K. POOLE in Case 
No. 930905795 to the following: 
Larry R. Vonwald, Pro Se 
2535 East Chalet Road 
Sandy, Utah 84093 
Larry L. Whyte, Esq. 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and by depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage 
prepaid thereon, in the United States Mails at Salt Lake City, Utah 
this Jyvt day of August, 1995. f 
Susan^C. Held ^r 
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DENNIS K. POOLE (2625) 
ANDREA NUFFER (6623) 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 263-3344 
Telefax: (801) 263-1010 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY R. VONWALD, : STIPULATION FOR RELEASE OF 
CASH BOND 
Plaintiff, t 
-vs- : 
CIVIL NO. 930905795 
KEVIN PLUMB, : 
JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Defendant. : 
THE DEFENDANT KEVIN PLUMB, by and through his attorney Dennis 
K. Poole, and the PLAINTIFF LARRY R. VONWALD, by and through his 
attorney Larry L. Whyte, respectfully stipulate and agree as 
follows: 
1. That Defendant has filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment 
for Attorney's Fees and Costs which is pending before this Court. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant desire to resolve such Motion and 
all remaining issues between them in accordance with the terms of 
this Stipulation. 
plumvon.stp (dkp) 
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3. Plaintiff and Defendant stipulate and agree that 
Plaintiff's cash supersedeas bond in the sum of $5,500 shall be 
released by the Clerk of the Court to be disbursed as follows: 
(a) The sum of $5,315.44 shall be paid to Dennis K. Poole, 
attorney for the Defendant, for the benefit of Defendant and 
counsel. 
(b) The sum of $184.56 shall be disbursed to Plaintiff. 
4. Upon the receipt of funds by Defendant's counsel as 
specified herein, Plaintiff shall be deemed to have satisfied all 
obligations in favor of the Defendant and the Order of the Court 
shall reflect the same. 
5. Upon receipt of such funds, Defendant shall cause a 
Satisfaction of Judgment to be filed with the Court. 
DATED this *l&&
 d a y o f i^eeeS^^ 1995, 
//'*tst^-> 
DENNIS K. POOLE 
ANDREA NUFFER 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys^ or Defendant 
LARRY L. WHY1>£ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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DENNIS K. POOLE (2625) 
ANDREA NUFFER (6623) 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 263-3344 
Telefax: (801) 263-1010 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY R. VONWALD, : ORDER FOR RELEASE OF 
CASH BOND 
Plaintiff, : 
-vs- : 
CIVIL NO. 930905795 
KEVIN PLUMB, : 
JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Defendant. : 
THE DEFENDANT KEVIN PLUMB, by and through his attorney Dennis 
K. Poole, and the PLAINTIFF LARRY R. VONWALD, by and through his 
attorney Larry L. Whyte, having stipulated to the release of Cash 
Bond and for disbursement thereof, and for good cause appearing 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the case bond of the Plaintiff in 
the sum of $5,500 be disbursed by the Clerk of the Court as 
follows: 
(a) The sum of $5,315.44 shall be paid to Dennis K. Poole, 
attorney for the Defendant, for the benefit of Defendant and 
counsel. 
(b) The sum of $184.56 shall be disbursed to Plaintiff. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that upon receipt of funds by the 
Defendant, Defendant shall file with the Court a satisfaction of 
Judgment. 
9W5'A 
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ORDER dated this^^ day of 
JUDGE GLENN K 
Approved as to Form: 
J=± 
Larry L. WHyte, Esq. 
Attorney for the Plai 
A toasts* 
DENNIS K. POOLE (2625) 
ANDREA NUFFER (6623) 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone (801) 263-3344 
Telecopier (801) 263-1010 
v^>J 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY R. VONWALD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs • 
KEVIN PLUMB, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO AMEND ORDER 
CASE NO. 930905795 
JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Defendant, Kevin Plumb,,by and through his attorney Dennis K. 
Poole, pursuant to Rule 60 and/or the equitable powers of this 
Court, respectfully requests of the Court as follows: 
1. Should the Court determine that an Order of the Court 
dated January 2, 199 6, is ambiguous, for an order amending the same 
to require a satisfaction of the amounts paid as recited in such 
Order only. 
2. For an order amending that certain Stipulation dated the 
2nd day of January, 1996, as the result of a mutual mistake of fact 
or a unilateral mistake of fact,which is known, or should have been 
known, by the Plaintiff. 
OfrOSSi 
3. In the event that an ambiguity exists and reformation is 
not ordered, for an order of the Court vacating such Stipulation 
and Order based upon mutual mistake of fact or unilateral mistake 
known to the Plaintiff. 
This Motion is supported by Defendant's Memorandum In Opposi-
tion to Plaintiff's Motion for Full Satisfaction and to Stay Execu-
tion and in Support of Defendant's Motion to Amend Order filed 
contemporaneously herewith. This Motion is also supported by the 
Affidavit of Dennis K. Poole filejd-^Gontemporaneously herewith. 
DENNIS K. P O O L E " ^ 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing Motion to Amend Order in Case No. 930905795 was mailed, 
United States Mail, postage prepaid, the 3a day of January, 199 6, 
to the following: 
Larry L. Whyte, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
265 East 100 South, Suite 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84Ml 
TLUMB MOT (EO) 
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DENNIS K. POOLE (2625) 
ANDREA NUFFER (6623) 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 263-3344 
Telefax: (801) 263-1010 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY R. VONWALD, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
KEVIN PLUMB, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FULL 
SATISFACTION AND TO STAY 
EXECUTION AND IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND 
ORDER 
CIVIL NO. 930905795 
JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Defendant respectfully submits this Memorandum in Opposition 
to Plaintiff's Motion for Full Satisfaction of Judgment and Motion 
to Stay Execution and in support of Defendant's Motion to Amend 
Order. 
I. FACTS 
This matter originally came before this Court (the Honorable 
Glenn K. Iwasaki) for hearing on Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the 24th day of March, 1994, and thereafter on Defen-
dant's Motion for Attorney's Fees. The Court granted Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims and 
awarding Defendant attorney's fees and costs of $4,064.90 (some-
plumjan.mcm (ilkp) ; A .;A A •£>, \f\ r\*j 
times referred to herein as the "June Judgment"). Plaintiff subse-
quently filed a Notice of Appeal from the Judgment and Order of 
this Court regarding said Motions. 
On May 25, 1995, the Court of Appeals issued its Memorandum 
Decision affirming the Judgment and Order of this Court with re-
spect to the dismissal of Plaintiff's claims. The Court of 
Appeals, in its Memorandum Decision, also found that Defendant and 
Appellee was entitled to attorney's fees and costs incurred on 
appeal. On June 8, 1995, Plaintiff filed a Petition for Rehearing, 
which Petition was later denied. Later, on September 15, 1995 
Plaintiff filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the Utah 
Supreme Court, which Petition was denied December 7, 199 5. 
The Utah Court of Appeals remanded the matter to this Court 
for consideration of an award of attorney's fees and costs. Based 
upon that remand, on December 12, 1995, Defendant filed two 
Motions: (i) a Motion for Release of Cash Bond; and (ii) a Motion 
for Entry of Judgment For Attorney's Fees and Costs specifically 
for (a) Defendant's attorney's fees incurred on appeal, (b) Defen-
dant's costs incurred in connection with the appeal, and (c) Defen-
dant's attorney's fees in bringing the Motion for additional attor-
ney's fees. Defendant claimed costs and attorney's fees totaling 
$5,475.44 on appeal. See Affidavit of Dennis K. Poole dated Decem-
ber 12, 1995, a copy of which is attached to Plaintiff's Motion as 
Exhibit "E." 
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During December, 1995, counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant 
negotiated a $160.00 reduction in the amount claimed by Defendant 
under the terms of the December 12, 1995 Motion and Affidavit and 
thereafter entered into a Stipulation for release of a Cash Bond 
for payment of the same. Plaintiff now claims that such Stipula-
tion also requires the entry of a satisfaction for the June Judg-
ment of $4,064,90. Defendant disputes this claim, asserting that 
it was not the intent of the parties to release the prior judgment 
which remains unpaid. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. THE JANUARY 2, 1996 STIPULATION RESOLVED THE OUT-
STANDING MOTIONS AND DID NOT SATISFY THE JUNE 
JUDGMENT. 
As the Court is aware, this matter arose out of the Plain-
tiff's misreading of a condition precedent contained in a Real 
Estate Purchase Contract between Plaintiff as Seller and Defendant 
as Buyer. As a result of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
this Court determined that the contract was not ambiguous and that 
Defendant was entitled to judgment for his attorney's fees and 
costs. A judgment in the amount of $4,064.90 was entered on or 
about June 9, 1994 (the "June Judgment"). Plaintiff has paid 
nothing against the June Judgment. 
Plaintiff chose to appeal the June Judgment to the Court of 
Appeals and having lost the appeal subsequently made a Request for 
Rehearing and a Petition for Certiorari. The appellate courts 
having sustained the June Judgment, on December 12, 1995, Defendant 
plumjan mem (dkp) «J 't'j <*A < y ^ 
filed a Motion for attorney's fees and costs incurred on the ap-
peals to which the Court of Appeals concluded Defendant was enti-
tled. Defendant claimed in his Motion for Entry of Judgment for 
Fees and Costs that he was entitled to a judgment of $5,475.44. 
In response to the Motion, Larry Whyte called Defendant's 
counsel and negotiated a reduction of $160.00 in the amount claimed 
in the Motion and supporting Affidavit. Plaintiff now asserts that 
he is entitled to a satisfaction of the June Judgment, although no 
specific negotiations occurred with respect to satisfaction of the 
prior judgment and nothing was paid against the same. The terms of 
the parties' Stipulation, the Court's Order and the history of this 
case do not support Plaintiff's position. 
When Plaintiff filed his Motion for Entry of Judgment for 
Attorney's Fees and Costs and his separate Motion for Release of 
Bond, no other issues were pending before the Court. The Stipula-
tion dated January 2, 199 6 specifically refers to the pending 
Motion for Entry of Judgment for Attorney's Fees and Costs and the 
parties desire to resolve such Motion and all remaining issues --
clearly the Motion for Release of Bond. The stipulation then 
provided that the Clerk would disburse those funds and Defendant 
would provide a satisfaction "upon receipt of such funds." As is 
evident from Mr. Whyte's own handwriting on Exhibit "E" to his 
Motion, he agreed that the amount being negotiated and paid was for 
fees and costs claimed in the pending Motion and supporting Affi-
davit (primarily fees and costs on appeal) , and had no relationship 
plumjan mem (dkp) 
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to the outstanding judgment. Nowhere does the Stipulation specify 
that a satisfaction was to be entered as to the June Judgment. 
Plaintiff asserts in his Motion that the Defendant agreed the 
payment was to satisfy all obligations, including the June Judg-
ment. Such an interpretation is a misreading of the Stipulation 
for the following reasons. First, such a reading is beyond the 
scope of the Stipulation; by its terms it was to resolve the issue 
of a claim for additional fees and costs and the pending Motion for 
release of bond. Second, the outstanding, unsatisfied June Judg-
ment was not an issue pending before the court; the claim for prior 
fees and costs had already been liquidated and reduced to judgment. 
Third, there is no reference within the terms of the Stipulation or 
the Court's Order dated January 2, 199 6, to the prior June Judg-
ment, only to a satisfaction related to payment of the amount to be 
disbursed to Defendant. Fourth, and most important of all, logic 
does not support Defendant's compromise and satisfaction of an out-
standing judgment for an amount in excess of $4,000, supported by 
an opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals, by the mere payment of 
approximately $5,000, being the amount of the additional claim!1 
Indeed, if Mr. Whyte intended to receive a satisfaction of all 
claims totaling in excess of $9,000, why did he not request the 
same be specific reference to the prior judgment, especially when 
he was previously advised that the amounts claimed would not be 
1
 See Argument that Satisfaction was without consideration. 
Section B. 
plumjan mem (dkp) 
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compromised? Why would counsel for the Defendant agree to the pay-
ment of only the additional fees and costs on appeal and waive the 
amounts due on the June Judgment without any payment at all? 
Clearly, Plaintiff's request was not within the contemplation of 
either party and Plaintiff is merely looking for language to sup-
port the avoidance of a just debt and obligation. 
B. THERE IS NO CONSIDERATION FOR RELEASE OF THE JUNE, 
19 9 4 JUDGMENT. 
Plaintiff asserts that he is entitled to a release of the June 
Judgment by the parties' Stipulation to satisfy the outstanding 
claims for attorney's fees and costs on appeal. Yet it is apparent 
from Mr. Whyte's own handwritten notes on Exhibit "E" that the 
amount compromised and to be paid related solely to the pending 
Motion for Entry of Judgment For Attorney's Fees and Costs. (See 
Page 5 of the Exhibit.) Absolutely nothing was allocated by Mr. 
Whyte to the prior June Judgment. Consequently, Plaintiff is ask-
ing for the release of a prior judgment when admittedly nothing has 
been paid against it. 
As before, Plaintiff is asking the Court to interpret language 
of a document, in this Case a Stipulation, without consideration of 
the total facts, events and circumstances before the parties and 
the requirement that consideration be paid for satisfaction of the 
June Judgment. Davis v. Barrett, 467 P.2d 603, 604 (Utah 1970) 
("it is horn book law that a release is not supported by sufficient 
consideration unless something of value was received to which the 
creditor had no previous right."). Because the requested satisfac-
plumjan.mem (dkp)
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tion of the June Judgment is without any consideration, Plaintiff 
is not entitled to a satisfaction. 
C IF AN AMBIGUITY EXISTS, DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO AN 
ORDER OF THE COURT AMENDING THE JANUARY 2, 199 6 
ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 60. 
If any ambiguity exists as to the January 2, 199 6 Order and 
the required issuance of a Satisfaction of Judgment, Defendant is 
entitled to an Order pursuant to Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure amending the January Order. The effect of the January 2, 
1996 Order was to award Plaintiff a judgment of $5,315.44. It was 
therefore logical and appropriate that Defendant be required to 
provide a satisfaction of judgment for such amount upon receipt of 
the same; then and only then would there be evidence of satisfac-
tion of the Court's order. The Order so states: "[Ujpon receipt 
of funds by the Defendant, Defendant shall file with the Court a 
satisfaction of Judgment." 
If, because of clerical error, there is an ambiguity that 
Defendant was to issue a satisfaction as to the January 2, 1996 
Order only, the Court has the power pursuant to Rule 60 to modify 
the prior order and explicitly provide for the limited satisfac-
tion. Clearly, equity and justice would not permit Plaintiff to 
avoid his legitimate obligations by virtue of clerical error. 
D. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO RELIEF FROM A MISTAKE OF 
FACT. 
It is apparent from the facts set forth above that Defendant 
never intended to issue to Plaintiff a Satisfaction of Judgment for 
the June Judgment by the mere compromise and settlement of the 
plumJAtunem (dkp) 
additional claims for attorney's fees and costs on appeal. It is 
also apparent that if the Court adopts Plaintiff's tortured reading 
of the Stipulation and Order, Plaintiff either was a party to a 
mutual mistake of fact or had knowledge of Defendant's unilateral 
mistake of fact. 
In order for a mutual mistake of fact to exist, 
1. The mistake must be of so grave a consequence that 
to enforce the contract as actually made would be unconscion-
able. 
2. The matter as to which the mistake was made must 
relate to a material feature of the contract. 
3. Generally the mistake must have occurred notwith-
standing the exercise of ordinary diligence by the party 
making the mistake. 
4. It must be possible to give relief by way of rescis-
sion without serious prejudice to the other party except the 
loss of his [or her] bargain. In other words, it must be pos-
sible to put him [or her] in status quo. 
Mostroncr v. Jackson, 866 P.2d 573, 580 (Utah App. 1993) (citing B 
6c A Assoc, v. L.A. Young Sons Constr. Co., 796 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 
1990) ) . There is little doubt in this case that to forgive half of 
Plaintiff's obligations by virtue of a mistake would be unconscion-
able. Furthermore, relief is possible; either rescission or 
reformation is available to the parties, as set forth below. The 
facts also demonstrate that ordinary diligence was exercised; Defen-
dant prepared the Stipulation and Order, copies were sent to Plain-
tiff 's counsel, and Plaintiff never requested any changes to the 
Stipulation and Order which Plaintiff perceived to be ambiguous. 
plumjan mem (dkp) 8 
Even if a Mutual Mistake has not occurred, the Court is 
authorized to vacate the Stipulation for a unilateral mistake by 
Defendant. In Guardian State Bank v. Stangle, 778 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah 
19 89), the Utah Supreme Court held as follows: 
Even apart from cases involving an incorrect memori-
alization of an agreement, where a unilateral mistake of 
fact is the basis of the parties' agreement, a court is 
not always without power to afford relief. For example, 
in Tolboe Constr. Co. v. Staker Paving & Constr. Co, 682 
P.2d 843 (Utah 1984), we upheld the trial court's ruling 
that an offeree could not rely on promissory estoppel 
when the offeror made a unilateral mistake which the 
offeree either knew or must have known about. [Citations 
omitted. ] 
Further, in Rothe v. Rothe, 787 P.2d 534 (Utah App. 1990), the 
Court of Appeals concluded that " [t]he Utah Supreme Court has also 
clarified that unilateral mistake in the formalization of a writing 
may also provide an appropriate basis for reformation." Id. at 
Thus, in this matter, the Court can reject Plaintiff's asser-
tion that he is entitled to a Satisfaction of the June Judgment, 
reform the Stipulation to meet the intent of the parties, or as a 
last resort, vacate the Stipulation between the parties and return 
the parties to the status quo. 
E. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL ATTORNEY'S 
FEES. 
The June Judgment provides in Paragraph 6: 
It is further ordered that the judgment in favor of 
Plaintiff shall be augmented in the amount of reasonable 
costs and attorney's fees expended in collecting said 
judgment by execution or otherwise, as shall be estab-
lished by affidavit. 
pluinjan.mcm (dkp) _ 
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By virtue of the need for Defendant to defend against Plaintiff's 
Motions and the filing of his own motion, Defendant has been re-
quired to incur additional attorney's fees as set forth in the 
Affidavit of Dennis K. Poole. Consequently, Defendant is entitled 
to a judgment for the amount of these additional attorney's fees. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant respectfully requests 
that this Court enforce the Stipulation as intended by Defendant, 
or if ambiguous reform the Stipulation, or in the alternative, 
vacate the Stipulation and Order. Additionally, Defendant requests 
an award of attorney's fees incurred in defending against Plain-
tiff's motions and in bringing DefLaiidant's motion. 
DATED this ^0 day of January, 
DENNIS K. POOLE 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FULL 
SATISFACTION AND TO STAY EXECUTION AND IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO AMEND ORDER in Case No. 930905795 was mailed, United 
States Mail, postage prepaid, the 3t> day of January, 1996, to the 
following: 
Larry L. Whyte, Esq. 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utal 
Attorney for Plainti\ff 
plumjanmem (dkp) 
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DENNIS K. POOLE (2625) 
ANDREA NUFFER (6623) 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 263-3344 
Telefax: (801) 263-1010 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY R. VONWALD, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
KEVIN PLUMB, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
DENNIS K. POOLE 
(January 26, 1996) 
CIVIL NO. 930905795 
JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
DENNIS K. POOLE, being first duly sworn, upon oath, deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. I am the attorney for Defendant in the above-entitled 
action. 
2. Defendant prevailed on a Motion for Summary Judgment on 
the 24th day of March, 1994, and thereafter was awarded attorney's 
fees . 
3. Plaintiff in the above-entitled action filed a Notice of 
Appeal from the Judgment and Order of this Court. 
PlHMVr>N2 AFF (Df P) 
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4. On the 30th day of August, 1994, the Honorable Glenn K. 
Iwasaki entered an order approving a cash supersedeas bond in the 
sum o£ $5,500, which bond, in whole or in part, has been tendered 
and posted by Plaintiff. 
5. On May 25, 199 5, the Court of Appeals issued its memoran-
dum decision affirming the Judgment and Order in favor of Defendant 
and further found that Defendant was entitled to his attorney's 
fees and costs incurred on appeal. 
6. On June 8, 1995, Plaintiff filed a Petition for Rehear-
ing, which Petition was later denied. 
7. On September 15, 1995 Plaintiff filed a Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari, which Petition was denied December 7, 1995. 
8. On December 12, 1995, Defendant filed a Motion for Release 
of Cash Bond for application against the outstanding judgment and 
amounts due Defendant. 
9. On December 12, 1995, Defendant also filed a Motion for 
Entry of Judgment For Attorney's Fees and Costs specifically for 
(i) Defendant's attorney's fees on appeal, (ii) Defendant's costs 
incurred in connection with the appeal, and (iii) Defendant's 
attorney's fees in bringing the Motion for additional attorney's 
fees. The Motion was supported by Affidavit and Memorandum claim-
ing total costs and fees of $5,475.44. See a true and correct copy 
of the Affidavit attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
10. Prior to Christmas, 199 5, Larry Whyte, attorney for 
Plaintiff, telephoned Affiant asking if the matter could be 
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resolved at a discount. Mr. Whyte was specifically told by Affiant 
that the amounts claimed would not be compromised after the long 
appellate process, but that payment terms over approximately 60 
days would be considered. Mr. Whyte suggested that we should at 
least resolve the pending Motion and he would get back to Affiant. 
A few days later Mr. Whyte called again and requested credit upon 
fees and costs claimed in the December 12, 1995 Affidavit for the 
one hour that Affiant would not have to attend a hearing, if the 
matter was resolved. Affiant agreed to the reduction of $160 for 
the claimed fees and that the bond would be released to pay the 
amounts claimed in the Affidavit in exchange for a satisfaction of 
these claims. (See copy of Affiant's Affidavit dated December 12, 
1995, provided to the Court by Mr. Whyte as Exhibit "E" to his 
Motion which clearly shows on page 5 in Mr. Whyte's handwriting, a 
reduction of fees attributable to the Motion by $160.00.) There 
was no discussion about a satisfaction of the prior judgment and 
Affiant did not agree to release the same. 
11. The negotiated figure set forth above was solely in ref-
erence to Defendant's outstanding Motion for additional attorney's 
fees and costs and had no relationship, factually or by amount, to 
an outstanding judgment against Plaintiff in the amount of 
$4,064.90 docketed with the Court on or about June 8, 1994. A 
draft of the Stipulation and Order was forwarded to Mr. Whyte, who 
made no request for changes. 
PLHMVON2.AFF (DKP) 
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12. On January 2, 1996, Affiant obtained the signature of Mr. 
Whyte upon a Stipulation for Release of Cash Bond. The Stipulation 
recites that Defendant has filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment for 
Attorney's Fees and Costs and that the parties desired to resolve 
such Motion and the remaining issues. Since the prior judgment had 
been upheld on appeal, Affiant understood that the only remaining 
issue for resolution by the Court was Defendant's outstanding 
Motion for Release of the Cash Bond. Because Plaintiff and Defen-
dant were agreeing that Defendant was to have an order requiring 
the payment of $5,315.44 from the Bond, Affiant believed that 
Defendant was entitled to a satisfaction of judgment upon receipt 
of that payment. At the time Mr. Whyte's signature was obtain, Mr. 
Whyte made no mention of obtaining a satisfaction of the June 8, 
1994 judgment. 
13. Pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation, Affiant obtain-
ed an Order of the Court which provided that Defendant was to re-
ceive a disbursement of the Bond pursuant to the terms of the Stip-
ulation and that Defendant was obligated to provide a Satisfaction 
of Judgment upon receipt of the $5,315.44, clearly referring to 
this current Order and disbursement and not to any prior judgment. 
See a true and correct copy of the Order [absent signatures] 
attached hereto as Exhibit "B". 
14. Upon receipt of the payment of $5,315.44, Affiant filed 
with the Court a Satisfaction of Judgment (Partial) clearly reserv-
ing Defendant's right to pursue the prior Judgment. See a true and 
correct copy of the Satisfaction of Judgment (Partial) attached 
hereto as Exhibit "CM. 
15. Defendant has incurred additional attorney's fees in re-
sponding to Plaintiff's current Motion and in Support of Defen-
dant's own Motion and should be awarded additional fees of not less 
than $1,000.00, in preparing this Affidavit and a Memorandum. 
16. Defendant Kevin Plumb has not collected any sums or 
amounts due upon the June Judgment, 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
DATED this 3C> day of January, 1996. 
DENNIS K. POOLE 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
ACKNOWLEDGED before me th 
DENNIS K. POOLE. 
IS -^ day of January, 199 6 by 
My Commission Expires 
NOTARY PUBLIC ' 
Residing in Salt~Lake, Utah 
<7s '<?£'?/ 
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 r , UA'A Avkcfft JCy//'/ Notary Public " " " " 1 ELAINE COLBY I 4543 South 700 East #200 i 
Salt Lake City, Utsh £54107 I 
i l B \ * t W * > » f M y Commission Expires I 
' ^^rxt^S March 26, 1993 I 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS K. POOLE in Case No. 930905795 was 
mailed, United States Mail, postage prepaid, the ^^ day of 
January, 1996, to the following: 
Larry L. Whyte, Esq. 
265 East 100 S6utH>^Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah \ 84111 
I_ '</>?*>*+-*-
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VONWALD, LARRY R 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
PLUMB, KEVIN 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 930905795 CN 
DATE 04/01/96 
HONORABLE GLENN K IWASAKI 
COURT REPORTER TAPE 
COURT CLERK JMB 
TYPE OF HEARING: ORAL ARGUMENTS 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. VONWALD, LARRY R 
D. ATTY. POOLE, DENNIS K. 
THIS CASE COMES BEFORE THE COURT ON ORAL ARGUMENTS ON 
VARIOUS MOTIONS. APPEARANCES AS SHOWN ABOVE. 
BASED UPON THE REPRESENTATION OF RESPECTIVE COUNSEL, COURT 
ORDERS THE FOLLOWING: 
1) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STAY EXECUTION IS GRANTED; 
2) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FULL SATISFACTION IS DENIED; 
3) DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND ORDER IS GRANTED; 
4) EACH SIDE TO BEAR THEIR OWN ATTORNEY'S FEES; 
5) MR. POOLE IS DIRECTED TO PREPARE THE APPROPRIATE ORDER. 
fef}ft44* 
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DENNIS K. POOLE [2625] 
ANDREA NUFFER [6623] 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 263-3344 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY R. VONWALD, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
KEVIN PLUMB, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION 
TO PROPOSED ORDER 
CASE NO. 930905795 
JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
The Defendant Kevin Plumb, by and through his attorney Dennis 
K. Poole and pursuant to the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
respectfully submits this Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's 
Objection to Proposed Order. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant responds to Plaintiff's Objections paragraph by 
paragraph as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's objection to Paragraph 1 of the Order is 
nothing more and nothing less than a re-argument of Plaintiff's 
prior assertions. Nowhere does Plaintiff contend that the 
Paragraph is contrary to the Court's ruling. Consequently, the 
objection is inappropriate and should be stricken. 
plumb.HW << oh di r) 
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2. Paragraph 2 of Plaintiff's Objection is again a re-
argument of Plaintiff's position which has been ruled upon by the 
Court. 
3. Paragraph 3 is likewise a re-argument of the case and not 
an objection to the Order. The Court has already determined that 
an ambiguity existed in the prior Stipulation and Order which would 
allow the admission of extrinsic evidence. Furthermore, Plaintiff 
ignores a well established rule that extrinsic evidence maybe 
admitted to establish the existence of a mutual and/or unilateral 
mistake of fact. 
4. In objecting to Paragraph 4 of the proposed Order, 
Plaintiff cites Rule 9 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
alleging that averments of mistake must be set forth with particu-
larity. To the extent that this rule would has application for a 
post-judgment motion made pursuant to Rule 60, Defendant asserts 
that he set forth the alleged mistake in particularity as contained 
in the affidavit of Dennis K. Poole filed in support of Defendant's 
Motion to Amend. Notwithstanding a sworn affidavit, Plaintiff and 
his counsel chose not to contest any issue contained in that 
affidavit by counter-affidavit. Therefore, the Court must accept 
the statements contained in counsel's affidavit as undisputed 
facts, which with the admissions of Plaintiff's counsel at hearing, 
justify the Orders of the Court. 
Again, for the most part, the objections of Plaintiff in 
reference to Paragraph 4 are a re-argument of u.2 case. 
plumb.me2 l*c*\ Jir) 2 
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5. Plaintiff's argument to Paragraph 7 is unintelligible. 
It is believed that Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Plumb's Motion 
to Amend did not request a release of the funds for application 
against the December Motion for Attorney's fees and costs. Such a 
request would be useless; Defendant had already received a release 
of the bond pursuant to stipulation of the parties. Defendant's 
Motion to Amend requested the Court to revise the parties' Stipula-
tion and the January Order to clarify that the Satisfaction of 
Judgment to be issued was only for those funds received from the 
bond funds and applied in satisfaction of Defendant's pending 
Motion for Attorney's fees and costs and not as a satisfaction of 
the June, 1994 Judgment. Paragraph 7 amending the Court's January 
2, 1996 Order clearly so provides. In essence, the amendment 
states that receipt of funds from the release of bond results in 
satisfaction of the January 2, 1996 Order but not as a satisfaction 
of the June, 1994 Judgment of $4,064.90. 
Plaintiff incorrectly states that the Court set the Stipula-
tion aside. The Court will recall and as cited in the proposed 
Order (which statement is not objected to by counsel), Mr. Whyte 
was asked at the hearing if Plaintiff would rescind the parties' 
settlement agreement if the January 2, 1996 Order was amended. Mr. 
Whyte stated that no such rescission would be made. Consequently, 
the Court did not set aside the Stipulation but merely amended the 
Stipulation and Order clarifying the ambiguity. Thus, the amount 
of attorneys fees and costs claimed by the Defei^ant, being the sum 
plumb.me2 (sch dn) *D 
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of $5,315.44, was not and is not an issue before the Court. The 
settlement and Stipulation regarding such fees and costs stands 
between the parties. Consequently, by counsel's election not to 
rescind the settlement agreement, Plaintiff has waived any right to 
a hearing on the prior petition by Defendant for attorneys fees and 
costs incurred during the appeal of this matter. 
REVISED ORDER 
As result of the Plaintiff's objection and a re-reading of the 
proposed Order, Defendant has proposed two grammatical revisions to 
the Order which are set forth in a black-line copy attached hereto. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's Objections to the proposed Order is largely an 
attempt to re-argue the case. Furthermore, Plaintiff is now 
asserting that the Stipulation was set aside by the Court, a matter 
neither ruled upon nor an issue before the Court because of 
Plaintiff's waiver of the right to rescind. Plaintiff's Objections 
evidence a continued pattern of delay and irrational and illogical 
interpretation of the issues and rulings of the Court. Consequent-
ly, Plaintiff's objections should be denied and Defendant should 
have his attorneys fees incurred in responding to these objections 
which are interposed solely for delay and harassment. 
plumh.me? (srh dir) 4 0 0 0 & l\ .1 
DATED this /S> day of 996 
^yisyy~>* 
DENNIS K. POOLE 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAIN-
TIFF'S OBJECTIONS in case No. 930905795 to the following: 
Larry L. Whyte, Esq. 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and by deposition the same, sealed, with first-class postage 
prepaid thereon, in the United States Mails at Salt Lake City, Utah 
this i.rS day of April, 1996. 
Amy P. HaWiay >"" 
plumb.me2 (sen d i r ) £ 
FIU0DKTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
DENNIS K. POOLE (2625) 
ANDREA NUFFER (6623) 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 263-3344 
Telefax: (801) 263-1010 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY R. VONWALD, : ORDER 
Plaintiff, : ^\L\^^^[ 
-vs- : CIVIL NO. 930905795 
KEVIN PLUMB, : JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Defendant. : 
Plaintiff's Motion for Full Satisfaction of Judgment, 
Plaintiff's Motion to Stay Execution and/or Enforcement of 
Proceedings, Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Motion and 
Defendant's Motion to Amend Order having come on for hearing before 
the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki on the first day of April, 1996, and 
the Plaintiff being represented by his attorney Larry L. Whyte and 
the Defendant being represented by his attorney Dennis K. Poole and 
the Court having considered the arguments of counsel and the 
Affidavit of Dennis K. Poole and Memoranda in Support and Opposi-
0 ft ft 4 f <» 
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tion to such Motions and the Court having further considered the 
representations of Mr. Whyte that should the Court enter an Order 
amending the January 2, 1996 Order of the Court that the Plaintiff 
will not rescind the parties' Settlement Agreement/ 199 6 Order of 
•the—Court—that—the—Plaintiff—will—ne£—rescind—the—partners 
Settlement Agreement, and for good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, as follows: 
1. The motions pending before the Court are equitable in 
nature and are intended to resolve an ambiguity which is contained 
in a Stipulation of the parties and an Order of the Court dated 
January 2, 1996 (the "January Order"). 
2. There is no specific mention in the Stipulation or 
January Order to a Judgment previously granted in this matter in 
favor of the Defendant and against the Plaintiff in the sum of 
$4,064.90 entered on/or about June 9, 1994 (the "June Judgment"). 
3. From the Affidavit of Dennis K. Poole on file with the 
Court, and based upon the prior proceedings, it was the intent of 
the Defendant, through his counsel, to resolve by Stipulation 
Defendant's pending Motion for Entry of Judgment for Attorney's 
Fees and Costs dated December 12, 1995, wherein the Defendant 
claimed entitlement to attorney's fees and costs of $5,475.44 
("Defendant's Fee Motion"). 
plurnvon OFJ) t£VH* ^ 
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4. Upon consideration of Defendant's Fee Motion and 
supported by the Affidavit of Dennis K. Poole, it is apparent that 
a mutual mistake and/or unilateral mistake of fact which should 
have been known to Plaintiff's counsel occurred in the documenta-
tion of said Stipulation and the January Order which was intended 
to resolve Defendant's Fee Motion. 
5. As a result of the forgoing ambiguity and mistake of 
fact, the Plaintiff's Motion for Full Satisfaction be and the same 
is hereby denied, 
6. Plaintiff's Motion for Stay of Execution is now moot by 
virtue of the denial of Plaintiff's Motion for Full Satisfaction. 
7. The Court's Order dated January 2, 199 6 is hereby ordered 
amended to provide that upon the Defendant's receipt of the sum of 
$5,315.44, a partial satisfaction of judgment shall be entered for 
such amount and that the June Judgment previously entered in favor 
of the Defendant and against the Plaintiff, Larry R. Vonwald, in 
the sum of $4,064.90 (with interest, costs and attorneys' fees as 
may be provided therein), remains outstanding and unsatisfied as of 
this date, together with interest and costs remains outstanding and 
unsatisfied as of—this date. The Court notes that Defendant has 
already filed a partial satisfaction relative to the January 2, 
199 6 Order, as amended hereby. 
p l u r r t v o n <">RD ( S i H ) «_ 
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8. Based upon the forgoing, and by virtue of the equitable 
nature of the proceedings before the Court, each of the parties are 
to bear their own attorney's fees and costs relative to the Motions 
considered by the Court ory-^xi.1 1, 199 6. 
ORDERED DATED thig^^^fday of April, 1996. 
the C 
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Approved as to form '{;i^ sa. 
LARRY L. WHYTE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER in Case No. 930905795 to the 
following: 
Larry L. Whyte, Esq. 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and by depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage 
prepaid thereon, in the United States Mails at Salt Lake City, Utah 
this /o day of April, 1996. 
Amy P. Harmay ~/f~ 
plumvon ORD ISCH) 
ft 0 0' 4 fi -4 
DENNIS K. POOLE (2625) 
ANDREA NUFFER (6623) 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 263-3344 
Telefax: (801) 263-1010 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY R. VONWALD, : ORDER FOR SUPERSEDEAS BOND 
AND STAY OF PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff, : 
-vs- : 
CIVIL NO. 930905795 
KEVIN PLUMB, : 
JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Defendant. : 
THE PLAINTIFF LARRY R. VONWALD, by and through his attorney 
Larry L. Whyte having orally requested the Court to set the amount 
of a cash supersedeas bond by telephonic hearing on the 19 th day of 
September, 199 6, and the Defendant Kevin Plumb being represented by 
his attorney Dennis K. Poole who participated in such telephonic 
hearing, and the Court having heard the representations of counsel, 
and for good cause appearing 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. That Plaintiff may deposit a cash bond with the Clerk of 
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in the 
amount of $6,700. 
2. Conditioned upon such deposit and the presentation of 
evidence of the same to Defendant's counsel, and pursuant to the 
provisions of Rule 62 of the Utah Rules of Ci- 1 Procedure, all 
•>' |f:;?WW 
proceedings to collect that certain Order and Judgment entered on 
or about June 8, 19 94 in the principal sum of $4,064.9 0 (together 
with interest and other relief as provided therein) entered in 
favor or the Defendant and against the Plaintiff, including the 
enforcement of executions, a sheriff's sale scheduled for this date 
and continued until September 23, 1996, and any other collection 
fUifl af t* 
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resolving the threshold requirement of 
whether appellant's circumstances had materi-
ally changed; however, it does not follow that 
appellee's petition entitled her to relief. A trial 
court asked to render a judgment by default 
must first conclude that the uncontroverted al-
legations of an applicant's petition are, on their 
face, legally sufficient to establish a valid 
claim against the defaulting party. Stevens v. 
Collard, 180 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (Ct. App. 
1992). 
Purpose of rules. 
The fundamental purpose of the liberalized 
pleading rules is to afford parties the privilege 
of presenting whatever legitimate contentions 
they have pertaining to their dispute, subject 
only to the requirement that their adversaries 
have fair notice of the nature and basis or 
grounds of the claim and a general indication 
of the type of litigation involved. Williams v. 
State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966 (Utah 1982). 
Cited in Hjorth v. Whittenburg, 121 Utah 
324, 241 P.2d 907 (1952); Dowse v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., 123 Utah 107, 255 P.2d 723 (1953); 
Burr v. Childs, 1 Utah 2d 199, 265 P.2d 383 
(1953); Rees v. Archibald, 6 Utah 2d 264, 311 
P.2d 788 (1957); McGavin v. Preferred Ins. 
Exch., 7 Utah 2d 161, 320 P.2d 1109 (1958); 
Peterson v. Nielsen, 9 Utah 2d 302, 343 P.2d 
731 (1959); Smoot v. Lund, 13 Utah 2d 168, 369 
P.2d 933 (1962); Christensen v. Lelis Auto-
matic Transmission Serv., Inc., 24 Utah 2d 
165, 467 P.2d 605 (1970); Murdock v. Blake, 26 
Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 164 (1971); Whitmore v. 
Calavo Growers, 28 Utah 2d 165, 499 P.2d 849 
(1972); Whitmore v. Industrial Comm'n, 23 
Utah 2d 185, 499 P.2d 1290 (1972); Pacific Ma-
rine Schwabacher, Inc. v. Hydroswift Corp., 
525 P.2d 615 (Utah 1974); Midwest Realty v. 
City of West Jordan, 541 P.2d 1109 (Utah 
1975); Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah 
1979); Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94 (Utah 
1981); Eie v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 638 P.2d 
1190 (Utah 1981); Triple I Supply, Inc. v. Sun-
set Rail, Inc., 652 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1982); Sears 
v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1982); 
Rosenlof v. Sullivan, 676 P.2d 372 (Utah 1983); 
Rothey v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 754 P.2d 
1222 (Utah 1988); Sather v. Pitcher, 748 P.2d 
191 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Lloyd's Unlimited v. 
Nature's Way Mktg., Ltd., 753 P.2d 507 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988); Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, 
Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 784 P.2d 475 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989); Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764 (Utah 
1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading 
§§ 1 et seq., 59, 68 et seq., 141 et seq., 152 et 
seq., 174 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 1 to 53, 63 et 
seq., 99 et seq., 152 et seq., 163 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Infant's misrepresentation as to 
his age as estopping him from disaffirming his 
voidable transaction, 29 A.L.R.3d 1270. 
Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action 
as affected by opponent's motion for summary 
judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or di-
rected verdict, 36 A.L.R.3d 1113. 
Power of court sitting as trier of fact to dis-
miss at close of plaintiff's evidence notwith-
standing plaintiff has made out prima facie 
case, 55 A.L.R.3d 272. 
Right to amend pending personal injury ac-
tion by including action for wrongful death af-
ter statute of limitations has run against inde-
pendent death action, 71 A.L.R.3d 933. 
Dismissal of state court action for plaintiffs 
failure or refusal to obey court order relating to 
pleadings or parties, 3 A.L.R.5th 237. 
Key Numbers. — Pleading *=» 1 to 34, 38 Va 
et seq., 76 et seq., 127 et seq., 130 et seq. 
Rule 9. Pleading special matters. 
(a) (1) Capacity. It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a party to sue or 
be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative 
capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that 
is made a party. When a party desires to raise an issue as to the legal 
existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued or the 
authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, he 
shall do so by specific negative averment, which shall include such sup-
porting particulars as are peculiarly within the pleader's knowledge, and 
on such issue the party relying on such capacity, authority, or legal exis-
tence, shall establish the same on the trial. 
(2) Designation of unknown defendant When a party does not 
know the name of an adverse party, he may state that fact in the plead-
ings, and thereupon such adverse party may be designated in any plead-
ing or proceeding by any name; provided, that when the true name of 
such adverse party is ascertained, the pleading or proceeding must be 
amended accordingly. 
(3) Actions to quiet title; description of interest of unknown par-
ties. In an action to quiet title wherein any of the parties are designated 
in the caption as "unknown," the pleadings may describe such unknown 
persons as "all other persons unknown, claiming any right, title, estate or 
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interest in, or lien upon the real property described in the pleading ad-
verse to the complainant's ownership, or clouding his title thereto." 
(b) Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In all averments of fraud or 
mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with 
particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a 
person may be averred generally. 
(c) Conditions precedent. In pleading the performance or occurrence of 
conditions precedent, it is sufficient to aver generally that all conditions prec-
edent have been performed or have occurred. A denial of performance or 
occurrence shall be made specifically and with particularity, and when so 
made the party pleading the performance or occurrence shall on the trial 
establish the facts showing such performance or occurrence. 
(d) Official document or act. In pleading an official document or act it is 
sufficient to aver that the document was issued or the act done in compliance 
with law. 
(e) Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign 
court, judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is sufficient 
to aver the judgment or decision without setting forth matter showing juris-
diction to render it. A denial of jurisdiction shall be made specifically and with 
particularity and when so made the party pleading the judgment or decision 
shall establish on the trial all controverted jurisdictional facts. 
(f) Time and place. For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of a pleading, 
averments of time and place are material and shall be considered like all 
Dther averments of material matter. 
(g) Special damage. When items of special damage are claimed, they shall 
:>e specifically stated. 
(h) Statute of limitations. In pleading the statute of limitations it is not 
lecessary to state the facts showing the defense but it may be alleged gener-
dly that the cause of action is barred by the provisions of the statute relied 
>n, referring to or describing such statute specifically and definitely by section 
lumber, subsection designation, if any, or otherwise designating the provision 
elied upon sufficiently clearly to identify it. If such allegation is controverted, 
he party pleading the statute must establish, on the trial, the facts showing 
hat the cause of action is so barred. 
(i) Private statutes; ordinances. In pleading a private statute of this 
tate, or an ordinance of any political subdivision thereof, or a right derived 
rom such statute or ordinance, it is sufficient to refer to such statute or 
rdinance by its title and the day of its passage or by its section number or 
ther designation in any official publication of the statutes or ordinances. The 
ourt shall thereupon take judicial notice thereof. 
(j) Libel and slander. 
(1) Pleading defamatory matter. It is not necessary in an action for 
libel or slander to set forth any intrinsic facts showing the application to 
the plaintiff of the defamatory matter out of which the action arose; but it 
is sufficient to state generally that the same was published or spoken 
concerning the plaintiff. If such allegation is controverted, the party al-
leging such defamatory matter must establish, on the trial, that it was so 
published or spoken. 
(2) Pleading defense. In his answer to an action for libel or slander, 
the defendant may allege both the truth of the matter charged as defama-
tory and any mitigating circumstances to reduce the amount of damages, 
and, whether he proves the justification or not, he may give in evidence 
the mitigating circumstances. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Jle 9, F.R.C.P. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Fraud. 
—Forgery. 
—General accusations. 
Insufficient. 
Negligence. 
—Materiality of representation. 
—Misrepre sentation. 
Not properly pleaded. 
Properly pleaded. 
Judgment. 
—Foreign judgment. 
Lack of capacity. 
—Failure to raise. 
Waiver. 
—Specific negative averment. 
Libel and slander. 
—Actual harm. 
Mistake. 
—Mutual mistake. 
Contracts. 
Deeds. 
Ordinances. 
Special damages. 
—Accounting. 
—Amount. 
—Defamation. 
—Defined. 
—General and special damages. 
—Loss of earnings. 
—Notice. 
—Punitive damages. 
Allegations of fraud. 
Statute of limitations. 
—Pleading. 
—Reply. 
—Specificity. 
Cited. 
Fraud. 
—Forgery. 
While in a general way a forgery is fraudu-
lent, this is not the kind of fraud that Subdivi-
sion (b) requires to be pleaded with particular-
ity. Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Thorup, 7 
Utah 2d 33, 317 P.2d 952 (1957). 
—General accusations. 
Insufficient 
Use of terms "fraud," "conspiracy" and ''neg-
ligence" in complaint constituted general accu-
sations in the nature of conclusions of the 
pleader which, without the setting out of basic 
facts sufficient to constitute the charged ac-
tions, would not stand up against a motion to 
dismiss. Heathman v. Hatch, 13 Utah 2d 266, 
372 P.2d 990 (1962). 
A complaint in an action for allegedly pre-
venting plaintiff from securing default judg-
ment in prior action was insufficient where the 
allegations contained merely broad and gen-
eral statements that a false affidavit and false 
pleadings were filed and judges were con-
tacted, preventing plaintiff from obtaining a 
default judgment. Heathman v. Fabian, 14 
Utah 2d 60, 377 P.2d 189 (1962). 
In an action against a county building offi-
cial, plaintiffs allegation that the official's 
8igning of a temporary certificate of occupancy 
was a "representation to the citizens" by the 
county that the county had taken certain ac-
tions under the building code did not specifi-
cally allege that the official had intentionally 
or recklessly misrepresented any facts to them 
and, thus, they failed to state a valid claim for 
relief. DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428 (Utah 
1995). 
Negligence. 
General allegation that accounting firm was 
negligent in its preparation of financial state-
ment by reason of omissions and inaccuracies 
failed to comply with this rule. Milliner v. 
Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974). 
—Materiality of representation. 
One of the basic elements of pleading a cause 
of action based upon fraud is the materiality of 
the alleged false representation. In some in-
stances the pleader can meet this requirement 
by simply alleging the representation and its 
falsity, for by the very nature of the represen-
tation it must be either true or false in its en-
tirety. In other instances the materiality of the 
allegations is dependent upon the true facts. 
Davis Stock Co. v. Hill, 2 Utah 2d 20, 268 P.2d 
988 (1954). 
—Misrepresentation. 
The requirement in Subdivision (b) that cir-
cumstances constituting fraud should be stated 
with particularity is not limited to allegations 
of common-law fraud and reaches all circum-
stances where the pleader alleges the kind of 
misrepresentations, omissions, or other decep-
tions covered by the term "fraud" in its broad-
est dimension. Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 
656 P.2d 966 (Utah 1982). 
Not properly pleaded. 
Plaintiff's claim that defendant obtained a 
release from liability by fraud and misrepre-
sentation was not properly pleaded where the 
complaint did not allege that the release was 
obtained by fraud or misrepresentation, and 
the issue as to the validity of the release arose 
in plaintiff's affidavit in opposition to defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment. Norton 
v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983). 
Properly pleaded. 
Insurance company's answer (to action by in-
sured to recover on policy), which alleged that 
insured's answer on insurance application was 
fraudulent and material to the acceptance of 
the risk and that the insurance company would 
not have issued the policy (at least not at that 
rate) if the true facts had been made known, 
was sufficient and fair notice to put in issue all 
of the statutory defenses of deception in 
§ 31A-21-105, including an omission, incorrect 
statement, and misrepresentation ultimately 
found by the jury on a related alcohol question 
in a medical history attached to the applica-
tion. Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 
966 (Utah 1982). 
Judgment. 
—Foreign judgment 
Setoff was properly allowed against an Ari-
zona judgment pleaded in Utah. The Arizona 
judgment was res judicata insofar as it held 
that plaintiff's first cause of action was not 
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supported by evidence but it could not be res 
judicata as to matters that the Arizona court 
expressly refused to determine. Todaro v. 
Gardner, 3 Utah 2d 404, 285 P.2d 839 (1955). 
Lack of capacity. 
—Failure to raise. 
Waiver. 
Where defendant obtained information sub-
stantiating his defense of lack of capacity ten 
days prior to trial but waited until last day of 
trial to seek introduction of information and 
defense, trial court did not err in ruling defen-
dant had waived defense. Hal Taylor Assocs. v. 
Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982). 
—Specific negative averment. 
Pleadings of illegality and lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction do not put a party on notice 
to respond to a defense of lack of capacity; lack 
of capacity defense must be raised by specific 
negative averment. Hal Taylor Assocs. v. 
Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982). 
Defendant waived its right to raise the issue 
of plaintiffs lack of capacity to sue where the 
pleadings did not contain a specific negative 
averment of plaintiffs lack of capacity to sue. 
Phillips v. JCM Dev. Corp., 666 P.2d 876 (Utah 
1983). 
Libel and slander. 
—Actual harm. 
Although Subdivision (j)(l) does not require 
a showing of extrinsic facts to support the de-
famatory words being sued on, it is necessary 
to show that, as a consequence of those words, 
plaintiff has suffered actual harm. Allred v. 
Cook, 590 P.2d 318 (Utah 1979). 
Mistake. 
—Mutual mistake. 
Contracts. 
Even though the issue of mutual mistake 
vas not raised by the pleadings, it would have 
)een proper for the court, in consonance with 
lule 54(c)(1), to have reformed the contract if a 
nutual mistake of fact had been established by 
:lear and convincing evidence. Mabey v. Kay 
Peterson Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 287 (Utah 
.984). 
Deeds. 
Where, in quiet title action involving dispute 
JS to deeds, defendant did not set forth with 
»articularity any attack upon the deeds based 
n mutual mistake, defendant asserted owner-
hip only generally, and in opening statement 
efendant's counsel did mention mistake but 
id not ask for an amendment of the pleadings 
3 properly put mistake before the trial court, 
rial court improperly heard parol evidence in-
mded to modify the deeds and should only 
ave examined the face of the deeds in resolv-
ig the dispute. Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979 
Jtah 1979). 
Ordinances. 
Court of Appeals took judicial notice of mu-
icipal ordinance, where the information 
larging defendant with violating the ordi-
ance referred to the ordinance by its section 
umber, and thus complied with Subdivision 
) of this rule. Brigham City v. Valencia, 779 
.2d 1149 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Special damages. 
—Accounting. 
Although Rules of Civil Procedure are to be 
liberally construed, some degree of specificity 
must be had in order to guide the parties and 
the court in their preparation and delibera-
tions; therefore it was error to award compen-
satory damages, in action for accounting of 
partnership profits, based on unpleaded and 
highly speculative matters such as distress, 
anxiety, and the effect on profits if the one 
partner's experience and contacts had been uti-
lized. Graham v. Street, 2 Utah 2d 144, 270 
P.2d 456 (1954). 
—Amount. 
The law does not require a party to plead 
specifically the exact dollar amount of special 
damages. Hodges v. Gibson Prods. Co., 811 
P.2d 151 (Utah 1991). 
—Defamation. 
In action for libel and slander it was not nec-
essary for plaintiff to plead special damages in 
order to recover for suffering inflicted upon his 
mind and emotions. Prince v. Peterson, 538 
P.2d 1325 (Utah 1975). 
—Defined. 
Special damages are damages that are a nat-
ural consequence of the injury caused but that 
do not necessarily flow from the harmful act. 
Hodges v. Gibson Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 151 
(1991). 
—General and special damages. 
General damages are those which naturally 
and necessarily result from the harm described 
and so are said to be implied in law; special 
damages are those which are not so certain as 
to be implied in law, but must be pleaded so as 
to let the adversary know what will be in-
volved. Cohn v. J.C. Penney Co., 537 P.2d 306 
(Utah 1975). 
General damages are those that are the nat-
ural and necessary result of the wrongful act or 
omission asserted as the basis of liability; spe-
cial damages are the natural, but not the nec-
essary, result of an injury. Phillips v. JCM 
Dev. Corp., 666 P.2d 876 (Utah 1983). 
—Loss of earnings. 
Loss of earnings to date of trial and impair-
ment of earning capacity are both items of spe-
cial damages, but they may be proved under an 
allegation of general damages where the de-
scription of the injuries is such that everyone 
must know that of necessity there would be a 
loss of earnings and an impairment of earning 
capacity. Cohn v. J.C. Penney Co., 537 P.2d 
306 (Utah 1975). 
—Notice. 
In Utah there is no inflexible rule regarding 
the pleading of special damages; it is a ques-
tion of whether or not the pleadings contain 
such information as will apprise the defendant 
of the special damages which must of necessity 
flow from that which is alleged. Cohn v. J.C. 
Penney Co., 537 P.2d 306 (Utah 1975). 
One claiming special damages must plead 
each type of damage specifically so that the 
opposing party has an adequate opportunity to 
defend against the plaintiff's claims. Hodges v. 
Gibson Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991). 
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—Punitive damages. 
Allegations of fraud. 
Failure to allege and prove a tort for which 
compensatory damages would be allowed pre-
cluded award of punitive damages; since gen-
eral allegation of fraud did not establish enti-
tlement to compensatory damages, award of 
punitive damages was improper. Graham v. 
Street, 2 Utah 2d 144, 270 P.2d 456 (1954). 
Statute of limitations. 
—Pleading. 
The defense of statute of limitations was not 
available unless pleaded. Tanner v. Provo Res-
ervoir Co., 78 Utah 158, 2 P.2d 107 (1931). (It 
was otherwise as to actions against adminis-
trators. Gulbranson v. Thompson, 63 Utah 115, 
222 P. 590 (1923)). 
—Reply. 
Defendant's plea of statute of limitations 
was deemed, in law, to have been denied by 
plaintiff. Thomas v. Glendinning, 13 Utah 47, 
44 P. 652 (1896); Tate v. Rose, 35 Utah 229, 99 
P. 1003 (1909); Tate v. Shaw, 35 Utah 240, 99 
P. 1007 (1909). 
—Specificity. 
Contention that party failed to plead the spe-
cific subdivision of the section relied upon 
would not be considered on appeal where ques-
tion was raised for the first time, and in any 
event no one could have been misled. Attorney 
Gen. v. Pomeroy, 93 Utah 426, 73 P.2d 1277, 
114 A.L.R. 726 (1937). 
Defendant's pleading of the statute of limita-
tions generally without designating the sec-
tions of the statute or statutes upon which he 
relied was not in accordance with Subdivision 
(h) and therefore was an inadequate plea. 
Wasatch Mines Co. v. Hopkinson, 24 Utah 2d 
70, 465 P.2d 1007 (1970). 
Cited in Battistone v. American Land & 
Dev. Co., 607 P.2d 837 (Utah 1980); 
Katzenberger v. State, 735 P.2d 405 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987); Chapman ex rel. Chapman v. Pri-
mary Children's Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181 (1989). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 6 Am. Jur. 2d Associations 
and Clubs § 57; 19. Am. Jur. 2d Corporations 
§§ 2220, 2225; 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 819 
et seq.; 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and Deceit 
§§ 424 to 427; 50 Am. Jur. 2d Libel and Slan-
der §§ 403, 422 et seq.; 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limita-
tion of Actions § 459; 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties 
§§ 27, 34 to 40; 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading §§ 
9 to 14, 40, 53 to 56, 86 to 88; 65 Am. Jur. 2d 
Quieting Title § 69. 
C.J.S. — 7 C.J.S. Associations § 35; 19 
C.J.S. Corporations §§ 1327, 1334; 25 C.J.S. 
Damages § 131; 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander 
§§ 128 et seq., 148 et seq.; 54 C.J.S. Limita-
tions of Actions § 269 et seq.; 67A C.J.S. Par-
ties §§ 115, 117; 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 8, 21, 
22, 25, 27, 33, 76, 80, 86; 74 C.J.S. Quieting 
Title §§ 56, 63; 82 C.J.S. Statutes §§ 445, 446. 
A.L.R. — Recovery of punitive damages in 
action by purchasers of real property charging 
fraud or misrepresentation, 19 A.L.R.4th 801. 
Reports of pleadings as within privilege for 
reports of judicial proceedings, 20 A.L.R.4th 
576. 
Amendment of pleading after limitation has 
run, so as to set up subsequent appointment as 
executor or administrator of plaintiff who pro-
fessed to bring the action in that capacity with-
out previous valid appointment, 27 A.L.R.4th 
198. 
Plaintiffs rights to punitive or multiple 
damages when cause of action renders both 
available, 2 A.L.R.5th 449. 
Key Numbers. — Associations *=* 20(5); 
Corporations «=» 513(4), 514; Damages «=» 142; 
Libel and Slander *» 77 et seq., 90 et seq.; Lim-
itation of Actions «=» 183; Parties ** 72 to 74; 
Pleading «=> 8(1), (9), (13), (14), (15), (16), (18), 
14, 32, 39, 46, 59, 63; Quieting Title *=» 34(3); 
Statutes <*=» 280. 
Rule 10. Form of pleadings and other papers. 
(a) Caption; names of parties; other necessary information. All plead-
ings and other papers filed with the court shall contain a caption setting forth 
the name of the court, the title of the action, the file number, the name of the 
pleading or other paper, and the name, if known, of the judge to whom the 
case is assigned. In the complaint, the title of the action shall include the 
names of all the parties, but other pleadings and papers need only state the 
name of the first party on each side with an indication that there are other 
parties. A party whose name is not known shall be designated by any name 
and the words "whose true name is unknown." In an action in rem, unknown 
parties shall be designated as "all unknown persons who claim any interest in 
the subject matter of the action." Every pleading and other paper filed with 
the court shall also state the name, address, telephone number and bar num-
ber of any attorney representing the party filing the paper, which information 
shall appear in the top left-hand corner of the first page. Every pleading shall 
state the name and address of the party for whom it is filed; this information 
shall appear in the lower left-hand corner of the last page of the pleading. 
(b) Paragraphs; separate statements. All averments of claim or defense 
shall be made in numbered paragraphs, the contents of each of which shall be 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial Amendment, after expiration of time for fil-
§§ 11 to 14, 29 et seq., 187 to 191. ing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion 
C.J.S. — 66 C.J.S. New Trial §§ 13 et seq., made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845. 
115, 116, 122 to 127. Authority of state court to order jury trial in 
A.L.R. — Consent as ground of vacating civil case where jury has been waived or not 
judgment, or granting new trial, in civil case, demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041. 
after expiration of term or time prescribed by Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching 
statute or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 1191. verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion appeal, 38 A.L.R.4th 1170. 
or comments by judge as to compromise or set-
 J u r y t r i a l w a iver as binding on later state 
tlement of civil case, 6 A.L.R.3d 1457.
 c i v i l t r i a l > 4 8 A.L.R.4th 747. 
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits
 C o u r t r e p 0 r t e r ' 8 death or disability prior to 
in opposition toj motion for new trial in civil transcribing n o tes as grounds for reversal or 
case, 7 AL.R.3d 1000.
 n e w M * ? A L R 4 * h 1 0 4 9 
Quotient verdicts, 8 A.KR.Sd 335 Propriety of limiting to issue of damages 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of instruc-
 n e w d Q n d f i n a d e_ 
tions in civil case as affected by the manner m
 r , ° , c A T ^ c , , 
which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 501. quacy of damages-modern cases, 5 A.L.R.5th Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by 875. jury in civil case of scene of accident or prem- , Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory 
ises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918. damages for personal injury to or death of sea-
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference m a n i n actions under Jones Act (46 USCS 
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial Appx. § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness — 
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15 modern cases, 96 A.L.R. Fed. 541. 
A.L.R.3d 1101. Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of dam-
Absence of judge from courtroom during trial ages for personal injury or death in actions un-
of civil case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637. der Federal Employers* Liability Act (45 USCS 
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of §§ 51 et seq.) — modern cases, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in 189. 
case, or with partner or associate of such attor- Key Numbers. — New Trial *=» 13 et seq., 
ney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64 HO, 116. 
A.L.R.3d 126. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
tain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
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obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 60, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
"Any other reason justifying relief-" 
—Default judgment. 
—Impossibility of compliance with order. 
—Incompetent counsel. 
—Lack of due process. 
—Merits of case. 
—Mistake or inadvertence. 
—Mutual mistake. 
—Real party in interest. 
—Refund of fine after dismissal. 
Appeals. 
Clerical mistakes. 
—Computation of damages. 
—Correction after appeal. 
—Date of judgment. 
Void judgment. 
—Estate record. 
—Inherent power of courts. 
—Intent of court and parties. 
—Judicial error distinguished. 
—Order prepared by counsel. 
—Predating of new trial motion. 
Court's discretion. 
Default judgment. 
Effect of set-aside judgment. 
—Admissions. 
Form of motion. 
Fraud. 
—Burden of proof. 
—Divorce action. 
Independent action. 
—Constitutionality of taxes. 
—Divorce decree. 
—Fraud or duress. 
—Motion distinguished. 
Invalid summons. 
—Amendment without notice. 
Inequity of prospective application. 
Jurisdiction. 
Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable 
neglect. 
—Default judgment. 
Illness. 
Inconvenience. 
Meritorious. 
Merits of claim. 
Negligence of attorney, 
No claim for relief. 
—Delayed motion for new trial. 
—-Factual error. 
—Failure to file cost bill. 
—Failure to file notice of appeal. 
—Nonreceipt of notice and findings. 
—Trial court's discretion. 
—Unemployment compensation appeal. 
—Workmen's compensation appeal. 
Newly discovered evidence. 
—Burden of proof. 
—Discretion not abused. 
Procedure. 
—Notice to parties. 
Res judicata. 
Reversal of judgment. 
—Invalidation of sale. 
Satisfaction, release or discharge. 
—Accord and satisfaction. 
—Discharging representative of estate from 
further demand. 
—Erroneously included damages. 
—Prospective application of judgment. 
Timeliness of motion. 
—Confused mental condition of party. 
—Dismissal for lack of prosecution. 
—Fraud. 
—Invalid service. 
—Judicial error. 
—Jurisdiction. 
—Mistake, inadvertence and neglect. 
—Newly discovered evidence. 
—Order entered upon erroneous assumption. 
—"Reasonable time." 
—Reconsideration of previously denied motion. 
—Satisfaction. 
"Unauthorized appearance. 
Void judgment. 
—Basis. 
—Lack of jurisdiction. 
Cited. 
"Any other reason justifying relief." 
Subdivision (7) embodies three require-
ments: First, that the reason be one other than 
those listed in Subdivisions (1) through (6); sec-
ond, that the reason justify relief; and third, 
that the motion be made within a reasonable 
time. Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 657 
P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982); Richins v. Delbert 
Chipman & Sons, 817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
Where a defendant's motion to set aside 
judgment based on Subdivisions (b)(1) and (7) 
and his motion for a new trial claimed that 
plaintiff violated Rule 5(a) on several occasions 
by not providing defendant with a copy of 
pleadings, thereby causing surprise, centering 
on plaintiffs failure to provide a copy of his 
motion for summary judgment to defendant, 
which the latter claimed was a clear showing 
of fraud on plaintiffs part, the trial court could 
have believed in denying defendant's motion, 
that fraud was not present in what could be 
considered a lapse in procedure by plaintiffs 
counsel. Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Defendant's claim that he mistakenly en-
tered into an ill-advised stipulation without 
fully understanding its consequences was cor-
rectly characterized by trial court as mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise or neglect under Subdi-
vision (b)(1); because Subdivision (b)(1) ap-
plied, Subdivision (b)(7) could not apply and 
could not be used to circumvent the three-
month filing period. Richins v. Delbert 
Chipman & Sons, 817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
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—Default judgment 
It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial 
court to relieve a defendant from default and 
allow her to answer where it was shown that 
she had mistakenly believed that she was fully 
protected by a divorce decree and felt that such 
decree required her husband to bear the obliga-
tion and defend the action for her. Ney v. Har-
rison, 5 Utah 2d 217, 299 P.2d 1114 (1956). 
Trial judge did not abuse discretion in refus-
ing to set aside default judgment where defen-
dant asserted that he thought the summons 
was invalid and therefore paid no attention to 
it. Board of Educ. v. Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385, 384 
P.2d 806 (1963). 
Where any reasonable excuse is offered by 
defaulting party, courts generally tend to favor 
granting relief from a default judgment, unless 
it appears that to do so would result in sub-
stantial injustice to the adverse party. West-
inghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen 
Contractor, 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975). 
Subdivision (b)(7) did not apply in a case 
where defendant husband sought to set aside a 
default judgment of divorce 5 2/s months after 
its entry on the grounds that plaintiff wife had 
incorrectly stated the extent of his assets, and 
that he had not received a copy of the amended 
divorce decree; therefore the court had no juris-
diction to disturb the judgment. Kessimakis v. 
Kessimakis, 546 P.2d 888 (Utah 1976). 
Where defendant stated he failed to answer 
complaints due to naivete regarding the legal 
process but admitted that he had discussed the 
complaint with an attorney, had failed to de-
liver necessary documents to the attorney, and 
had never paid the attorney, it was not abuse 
of discretion for court to refuse to set aside de-
fault judgment against defendant "for any 
other reason justifying relief." J.P.W. Enters., 
Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486 (Utah 1979). 
Where plaintiff sought relief from a default 
judgment pursuant to Subdivision (b) on three 
occasions before three different judges and his 
motions were denied in the first two proceed-
ings, the third judge was barred by the law of 
the case from overruling the previous orders. 
Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987). 
—Impossibility of compliance with order. 
Impossibility of compliance with a court or-
der, such as an order that the defendant return 
property he has already sold, is an appropriate 
basis for amendment of the order. Corbett v. 
Fitzgerald, 709 P.2d 384 (Utah 1985). 
—Incompetent counsel. 
The provisions of Subdivision (b)(7) are suffi-
ciently broad to permit a court to set aside an 
order, dismissing a plaintiffs complaint, which 
was entered upon an assumption that the 
plaintiff was procrastinating and not answer-
ing interrogatories submitted to him and to en-
ter a new order based upon the record before it 
that plaintiff was represented by incompetent 
counsel and that defendants were not being 
unduly prejudiced. Stewart v. Sullivan, 29 
Utah 2d 156, 506 P.2d 74 (1973). 
—Lack of due process. 
A party claiming and establishing a lack of 
due process of law would be entitled to relief 
from a judgment under Subdivision (b)(7) even 
after the expiration of three months, because 
relief from a judgment on account of a lack of 
due process of law is not expressly provided for 
by this rule. Bish's Sheet Metal Co. v. Luras, 
11 Utah 2d 357, 359 P.2d 21 (1961). 
—Merits of case. 
Where defendant, in his reasons for setting 
aside default judgment, asserted that the judg-
ment entered was based upon a void contract 
for the reason that the contract did not comply 
with the statute of frauds, such assertion went 
to the merit of the case and could not be consid-
ered on motion to set aside judgment. Board of 
Educ. v. Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385, 384 P.2d 806 
(1963). 
—Mistake or inadvertence. 
Subdivision (b)(7) may not be used to circum-
vent the three-month filing period where the 
basis for the relief from judgment is based on 
mistake or inadvertence. Pitts v. McLachlan 
567 P.2d 171 (Utah 1977). 
Subdivision (b)(7) of this rule is not available 
to one who should have filed under Subdivision 
(b)(1) but did not do so within the three-month 
time limitation. Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 
652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982). 
The provisions of Subdivision (b)(7) may not 
be used to circumvent the time limitation on 
motions pursuant to Subdivision (b)(1). Gardi-
ner & Gardiner Bldrs. v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429 
(Utah 1982). 
Subdivision (b)(7) of this rule may not be re-
sorted to for relief when the ground asserted 
for relief falls within Subdivision (b)(1) since 
the three-month limitation on relief under 
Subdivision (b)(1) would be averted. Russell v. 
Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984). 
The three-month period allowed for Subdivi-
sion (b)(1) motions may not be circumvented by 
filing a motion under Subdivision (b)(7). 
Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984). 
—Mutual mistake. 
The legal descriptions in an otherwise final 
partition decree could be corrected under this 
rule because the evidence overwhelmingly sup-
ported the conclusion that a mutual mistake 
occurred in the drafting of the decree, since the 
partitioning judge did not intend to deprive the 
claimants of access to a major part of their 
properties. Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431 
(Utah 1993). 
—Real party in interest 
In action by corporation for legal services 
rendered, trial court's denial of defendant's mo-
tion to set aside default judgment on grounds 
plaintiff was not the real party in interest, un-
der Subdivision (b)(7) of this rule, was sup-
ported by evidence that plaintiff was the real 
party in interest and that defendant had 
knowledge thereof. Robinson v. Myers, 599 
P.2d 513 (Utah 1979). 
—Refund of fine after dismissal. 
Defendant's motion captioned "Motion for 
Return of Fine, Costs and Fees and Notice of 
Hearing," filed twenty days after the order of 
dismissal of the criminal case against him, al-
though not specified as such, was the proper 
subject of a motion under Subdivision (b)(1) 
and also sufficient to invoke Subdivision (b)(7) 
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relief. State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994). 
Appeals. 
An order denying relief under Subdivision 
(b) is a final appealable order. Moreover, im-
proper or untimely motions do not toll the time 
for appeal from final orders. Arnica Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
Clerical mistakes. 
—Computation of damages. 
Where damage award was based on the sum 
of four separate amounts listed in a letter ex-
hibit, and the sum of the amounts was in error, 
the error was within the definition of a clerical 
mistake and was subject to correction by the 
trial court. Stanger v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. 
Co., 669 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983). 
—Correction after appeal. 
Trial court may correct clerical error made 
in recording of decree after Supreme Court has 
affirmed erroneous decree on appeal. Bagnall 
v. Suburbia Land Co., 579 P.2d 917 (Utah 
1978). 
—Date of judgment. 
Void judgment. 
Where later judgment was void and different 
from earlier valid judgment, no appeal could be 
taken on ground that defendants were appeal-
ing from the earlier judgment and that inser-
tion of date of void judgment was merely a cler-
ical error which court could correct. Nunley v. 
Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 126, 
388 P.2d 798 (1964). 
—Estate record. 
The correction of the record in an estate is 
properly made in the probate court in which 
the errors occurred, and the court was justified 
in accepting parol evidence as to the incorrect-
ness of the record. Harmston v. Harmston, 5 
Utah 2d 357, 302 P.2d 270 (1956). 
—Inherent power of courts. 
The courts of this state had recognized the 
inherent right of a court to enter a judgment 
nunc pro tunc to correct clerical errors. Frost v. 
District Court ex rel. Box Elder County, 96 
Utah 106, 83 P.2d 737 (1938). 
—Intent of court and parties. 
The correction contemplated by Subdivision 
(a) of this rule must be undertaken for the pur-
pose of reflecting the actual intention of the 
court and parties. Lindsay v. Atkin, 680 P.2d 
401 (Utah 1984). 
—Judicial error distinguished. 
The distinction between a judicial error and 
a clerical error does not depend upon who made 
it; rather, it depends on whether it was made 
in rendering the judgment (judicial error) or in 
recording the judgment as rendered (clerical 
error). Richards v. Siddoway, 24 Utah 2d 314, 
471 P.2d 143 (1970). 
Question of whether an error is "judicial" or 
"clericar depends not on who made it, but on 
whether it was made in rendering the judg-
ment or in recording the judgment. Lindsay v. 
Atkin, 680 P.2d 401 (Utah 1984). 
—Order prepared by counsel. 
Erroneous assumption by judge in signing 
order that the order as prepared by counsel cor-
rectly reflected his judgment was a mistake of 
a perfunctory or clerical nature which the 
court could and properly did correct upon its 
own motion. Meagher v. Equity Oil Co., 5 Utah 
2d 196, 299 P.2d 827 (1956). 
—Predating of new trial motion. 
A court may not enter a nunc pro tunc pre-
dating a motion for new trial that is untimely 
filed so that the motion will be timely. Kettner 
v. Snow, 13 Utah 2d 382, 375 P.2d 28 (1962). 
Court's discretion. 
The trial court is afforded broad discretion in 
ruling on a motion for relief from judgment 
under Subdivision (b), and its determination 
will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discre-
tion. Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). 
Default judgment. 
Once a default judgment has been entered, it 
can only be set aside in accordance with Subdi-
vision (b). Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 
P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Effect of set-aside judgment. 
—Admissions. 
Subdivision (b) does not provide that as part 
of the order setting aside a judgment any ad-
missions are also set aside; those matters are 
covered exclusively by a motion made as pro-
vided by Rule 36(b). Whitaker v. Nikols, 699 
P.2d 685 (Utah 1985). 
Form of motion. 
Trial court did not err in vacating judgment 
in response to defendants' supplemental state-
ment of objections, which, though clearly mis-
labeled, was the functional equivalent of a mo-
tion to set aside the judgment under Subdivi-
sion (b), was filed in contemplation of the rule, 
contained the same kindB of arguments and as-
sertions one would normally expect to find in a 
motion to set aside the judgment, and was 
treated by the trial court as such a motion. 
Darrington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). 
Although a motion entitled "Clarification of 
Judgment" was not specifically provided for in 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, because the 
substance of the motion was to make clear a 
judgment that was not already clear, the mo-
tion was sufficient to invoke Subdivision (b) of 
this rule. Kunzler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
A motion to reconsider the final judgment of 
the district court is not provided for under the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and has never 
been recognized as a proper motion in this 
state. Wisden v. Bangerter, 893 P.2d 1057 
(Utah 1995). 
Fraud. 
—Burden of proof. 
Trial court properly refused to cancel a deed 
executed as part of a property settlement when 
it found that plaintiff did not prove that she 
had reasonably relied on the alleged represen-
tations of her ex-husband when agreeing to ex-
ecute the deed. Despain v. Despain, 855 P.2d 
254 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
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•—Divorce action. 
Motion to set aside provisions of divorce de-
cree concerning child custody and support 
based upon allegation that wife had perpetu-
ated a fraud upon the court by falsely claiming 
husband was child's father did not comply with 
Subdivision (b) and should have been denied. 
McGavin v. McGavin, 27 Utah 2d 200, 494 
P.2d 283 (1972). 
The wife in a divorce action was entitled to 
have the decree set aside on the ground of 
fraud where the assets of the parties may have 
been more than five times the amount dis-
closed by the husband who prevented the wife 
from gaining full and accurate knowledge of 
his total assets by transferring his corporate 
holdings to family members without relin-
quishing control of those assets, by 
understating the true value of jointly held 
property, and by avoiding compliance with 
court-ordered discovery. Boyce v. Boyce, 609 
P.2d 928 (Utah 1980). 
Independent action. 
—Constitutionality of taxes. 
Constitutionality of state income tax rates 
could only be raised in independent action and 
not in supplemental proceedings upon warrant 
for judgment for underpayment of income 
taxes. State Tax Comm'n v. Wright, 596 P.2d 
634 (Utah 1979). 
—Divorce decree. 
Where ex-husband brought independent ac-
tion in equity seeking relief from that part of 
divorce decree naming him father of unborn 
child and ordering payments for its support, on 
ground that child was not his, court properly 
ordered taking of blood test, and upon showing 
that ex-husband could not be father, properly 
granted relief sought. Egan v. Egan, 560 P.2d 
704 (Utah 1977). 
—Fraud or duress. 
Where "fraud upon the court" is the grava-
men of a proceeding to relieve a party of the 
effect of a judgment, such proceeding must be 
pursued in an independent action by filing a 
separate suit, and not by way of motion in the 
original action. Shaw v. Pilcher, 9 Utah 2d 
222, 341 P.2d 949 (1959). 
The three-month limitation period does not 
limit the power of a court to entertain an inde-
pendent common-law action to set aside a judg-
ment or decree for fraud or duress after the 
three-month period has expired. Rather, the 
doctrine of laches and other equitable princi-
ples determine the time within which the ac-
tion must be brought. St. Pierre v. Edmonds, 
645 P.2d 615 (Utah 1982). 
This rule does not limit the power of the 
court to entertain an independent action based 
on fraud. Despain v. Despain, 682 P.2d 849 
(Utah 1984). 
—Motion distinguished. 
Where plaintiff filed separate, independent 
action to vacate six-year-old divorce decree, 
but reverted to procedure for motion in the 
original action and trial court dealt with the 
matter as having been made on motion only, 
plaintiffs "action" became a motion to set aside 
judgment and, as such, was properly dismissed 
as having been filed beyond the statutory dead-
line. Howard v. Howard, 601 P.2d 931 (Utah 
1979). 
Invalid summons. 
—Amendment without notice. 
Where original summons designated a court 
which, because of the amount in controversy, 
could not have had jurisdiction and summons 
was improperly amended without notice to de-
fendant to indicate court with jurisdiction and 
where the complaint had been filed, defendant 
was entitled to relief from default judgment in 
latter court based on ground there had been no 
valid service of summons. Utah Sand & Gravel 
Prods. Corp. v. Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 
P.2d 703 (1965). 
Inequity of prospective application. 
The third clause in Subdivision (b)(6) pro-
vides a basis for relief from a judgment that 
has prospective application when subsequent 
events have occurred making enforcement of 
the judgment's prospective application no lon-
ger equitable. Party who claimed that the judg-
ment never was equitable but that he did not 
realize its inequity until later, but who did not 
allege that any subsequent event had rende'red 
the prospective application of the judgment no 
longer equitable, was not entitled to relief un-
der Subdivision (b)(6). Richins v. Delbert 
Chipman & Sons, 817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
Jurisdiction. 
The trial court has jurisdiction to consider a 
Subdivision (b) motion while an appeal is pend-
ing. If the trial court finds the motion to be 
without merit, it may enter an order denying 
the motion, and the parties may appeal from 
that order. If, however, the trial court is in-
clined to grant the motion, counsel should ob-
tain a brief memorandum to that effect from 
the trial court, and request an order of remand 
from the appellate court so that the trial court 
can enter an order. Baker v. Western Sur. Co., 
757 P.2d 878 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); White v. 
State, 795 P.2d 648 (Utah 1990). 
A trial court has no jurisdiction to consider 
the merits of an untimely motion under Subdi-
vision (b)(1). Richins v. Delbert Chipman & 
Sons, 817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excus-
able neglect. 
—Default judgment. 
A refusal to set aside a default divorce decree 
was not an abuse of discretion where the con-
duct of the party in default indicated absence 
of good faith and where the granting of relief 
would work an injustice upon the opposing 
party. Chrysler v. Chrysler, 5 Utah 2d 415, 303 
P.2d 995 (1956). 
It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial 
court to deny a motion for relief from a default 
judgment where there was evidence that plain-
tiffs attorney had called the defendant's attor-
ney several days before the default and re-
minded him that the matter was in default and 
in view of the fact that the plaintiff, an elderly 
woman, had traveled from Seattle, Washing-
ton, to be present and presented an accounting 
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at the default hearing. Masters v. LeSeuer, 13 
Utah 2d 293, 373 P.2d 573 (1962). 
Default judgments should have been set 
aside where stockholders seeking an opportu-
nity to protect their interest in actions against 
corporation, showed that process was served on 
person resigning as president, sending notices 
to only two other remaining directors when 
there was no active management functioning; 
that shareholders' group attempted to form a 
reorganization committee and hired counsel 
two days after final day for answering; and 
counsel on day of appointment, having been 
refused an opportunity to answer, filed motions 
to set aside default judgments. Mayhew v. 
Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 
P.2d 951 (1962). 
A default certificate may be set aside upon 
the grounds of excusable neglect. Heathman v. 
Fabian, 14 Utah 2d 60, 377 P.2d 189 (1962). 
Refusal to set aside default judgment on 
ground of excusable neglect was not error 
where defendant failed to contact his counsel 
from February to time of trial in September, 
and counsel did not attempt to contact defen-
dant until ten days before trial even though 
both had long been informed of approximate 
time of trial, notwithstanding claim that coun-
sel was unable to contact defendant due to de-
fendant's long working hours and his custom of 
visiting his wife who was terminally ill with 
cancer. Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 
30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429 (1973). 
Motion for relief from default judgment was 
properly denied to cosigner (father) who 
claimed that his son was the proper defendant 
and took no steps to file an answer to the com-
plaint. Pacer Sport & Cycle, Inc. v. Myers, 534 
P.2d 616 (Utah 1975). 
A trial court is justified in denying relief 
from a default judgment because of lack of 
timely request, long passage of time before 
making such request, general procedural ne-
glect, urgence of hypertechnicality about a 
statute, or an almost complete absence of sub-
stance or merit in the relief for which he 
prayed. Heath v. Heath, 541 P.2d 1040 (Utah 
1975). 
Motion to set aside default judgment was 
properly denied in case where defendant of-
fered no reasonable excuse for his nonappear-
ance, failed to respond to repeated attempts to 
contact him regarding status of the lawsuit he 
knew was pending, and knew that a hearing 
had been scheduled and that his counsel had 
withdrawn. Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d 855 
(Utah 1979). 
Where defendant claimed default judgment 
was due to his attorney's failure to communi-
cate with him, and the record showed that de-
fendant failed to contract his attorney for one 
and half years after he filed his answer and 
counterclaim, trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in denying defendant's motion to set 
aside the default judgment. Gardiner & Gardi-
ner Bldrs. v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429 (Utah 1982). 
In order for defendant to be relieved from a 
default judgment, he must not only show that 
the judgment was entered against him through 
any reason specified in Subdivision (b), but he 
must also show that his motion to set aside the 
judgment was timely, and that he has a meri-
torious defense to the action. A meritorious de-
fense is one which sets forth specific and suffi-
ciently detailed facts which, if proven, would 
have resulted in a judgment different from the 
one entered. State ex rel. Utah State Dep't of 
Social Servs. v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 
(Utah 1983). 
Default judgment should not have been en-
tered in tort case arising out of injuries in-
flicted upon plaintiff by defendant where con-
tradictions surrounding adequacy of service of 
process and other factors resulted in genuine 
mistake on part of defendant, in the absence of 
which the default would not have occurred. 
May v. Thompson, 677 P.2d 1109 (Utah 1984). 
Default judgment was proper where state-
ments of defendant demonstrated indifference 
on his part, and lack of diligence in pursuing 
his opportunity to defend. Russell v. Martell, 
681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984). 
Neither the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, 
§ 78-22a-l et seq., nor this rule, permits a 
court to set aside a foreign default judgment 
because of alleged inadvertence, mistake, or 
neglect absent a showing of fraud or the lack of 
jurisdiction or due process in the rendering 
state. Data Mgt. Sys. v. EDP Corp., 709 P.2d 
377 (Utah 1985). 
Failure to reserve rights under § 70A-3-
606(l)(a), which governs impairment of re-
course or of collateral in regard to commercial 
paper and does not apply to judgments, could 
not be used to set aside default judgments 
against debtors under Subdivision (b)(6) of this 
rule. First Sec. Bank v. Aarian Dev. Corp., 738 
P.2d 1019 (Utah 1987). 
Illness. 
Illness alone is not a sufficient excuse to 
make neglect in failing to defend a cause of 
action a ground for vacating a default judg-
ment. Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 
416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953). 
Inconvenience. 
Mere inconvenience or the press of personal 
or business affairs is not deemed as an excuse 
for failure to appear at trial. Valley Leasing v. 
Houghton, 661 P.2d 959 (Utah 1983). 
Meritorious. 
To be relieved from a default judgment, de-
fendant must not only show that the judgment 
was entered against him through excusable ne-
glect (or any other reason specified in Subdivi-
sion (b)), but he must also show that his motion 
to set aside the judgment was timely, and that 
his proposed answer contains a defense that is 
entitled to be tried. Erickson v. Schenkers Int'l 
Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994). 
Merits of claim. 
Usually, it is not appropriate on Subdivision 
(b) motions to examine the merits of the claim 
decided by the default judgment. Larsen v. 
Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984). 
Negligence of attorney. 
An oral promise made by the attorney for the 
plaintiff to the effect that defendant could have 
more time in which to answer, where the plain-
tiff already had obtained a default judgment, 
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vas now sufficient excusable neglect so as to 
illow the vacation of the default judgment. The 
lefendants were deprived of nothing by the al-
leged promise inasmuch as the default judg-
ment had already been entered. Such a prom-
ise could in no way bind a client who already 
had a judgment. Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 
123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953). 
Where defendant's counsel withdrew at pre-
trial conference and defendant claimed it re-
ceived no notice to appoint counsel and had no 
notice of trial until it received notice of default 
judgment, the default was set aside in the in-
terest of justice, the court stating that where 
there is doubt about whether a default should 
be set aside, the doubt should be resolved in 
favor of doing so. Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. 
Agla Dev. Corp., 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980). 
Where plaintiffs attorney and insurance ad-
juster for defendant's insurance company were 
engaged in settlement talks at time plaintiffs 
petition was filed, defendant was entitled to 
relief from subsequent summary judgment on 
grounds of "excusable neglect" since plaintiffs 
attorney had duty to notify adjuster of poten-
tial default and did not do so. Helgesen v. 
Inyangumia, 636 P.2d 1079 (Utah 1981). 
Party may not claim his attorney's neglect in 
failing to notify him of proceeding as grounds 
for setting aside a default judgment where the 
party has been negligent by not communicat-
ing with his attorney. Gardiner & Gardiner 
Bldrs. v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429 (Utah 1982). 
The trial court abused its discretion in refus-
ing to set aside a summary judgment after a 
failure to observe the rule prescribing the pro-
cedure to be followed upon withdrawal of an 
attorney had been brought to the attention of 
the court. Sperry v. Smith, 694 P.2d 581 (Utah 
1984). 
The reasons asserted by the defendant for 
setting aside the default judgment, that his at-
torney neglected to file an answer and that he 
mistakenly relied on his attorney's assurances 
that an answer had been filed, fell within Sub-
division (b)(1), not Subdivision (b)(7), and the 
defendant's filing of a motion to set aside the 
default judgment six months after its entry 
was therefore untimely. Lincoln Benefit Life 
Ins. Co. v. D.T. Southern Properties, 838 P.2d 
672 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
No claim for relief. 
Trial court abused its discretion in condition-
ing the setting aside of a default judgment 
against defendant upon his payment of attor-
ney fees where plaintiffs complaint was funda-
mentally flawed in that it appeared clearly 
upon the face of the complaint that no claim for 
relief was stated. Sovereen v. Meadows, 595 
P.2d 852 (Utah 1979). 
—Delayed motion for new trial. 
In furtherance of their discretion to grant 
relief "in furtherance of justice," district courts 
could allow a notice of motion for new trial to 
be filed, after the prescribed time limit when a 
proper application and sufficient showing 
therefor was made. Audia v. Denver & 
R.G.R.R., 45 Utah 459,146 P. 559 (1915); Lund 
v. Third Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Salt Lake 
County, 90 Utah 433, 62 P.2d 278 (1936). 
Party seeking relief "in furtherance of jus-
tice" to permit tardy filing of notice of motion 
for new trial hajd to do more than merely move 
the court to act and file the necessary affida-
vits in support of motion for a new trial; the 
applicant had to produce proper evidence upon 
which the court could base findings that 
through no fault of his he was prevented from 
filing notice of motion for a new trial within 
the time fixed by the statute, and had to pro-
duce satisfactory evidence why he did not ap-
ply for an extension of time at some time 
within the statutory limitation. Lund v. Third 
Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Salt Lake County, 
90 Utah 433, 62 P.2d 278 (1936). 
—Factual error. 
Correcting a description of real property to 
conform to the court's ruling, when the legal 
ruling remained unchanged, was a justifiable 
reason to change the original order under Sub-
division (b). Kunzler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
—-Failure to rile cost bill. 
Whether party would be relieved from ne-
glect in failing to file timely cost bill was 
within discretion of trial court. Hirsh v. Ogden 
Furn. & Carpet Co., 51 Utah 558, 172 P. 318 
(1918). 
—Failure to tile notice of appeal. 
Neither Rule 6(b), granting the court power 
to extend where a failure to act in time is due 
to "excusable neglect" generally, nor Subdivi-
sion (b)(1) authorizing the court to relieve from 
a final judgment for inadvertence or excusable 
neglect, applies where the notice of appeal has 
not been filed in time. Anderson v. Anderson, 3 
Utah 2d 277, 282 P.2d 845 (1955); Holbrook v. 
Hodson, 24 Utah 2d 120, 466 P.2d 843 (1970). 
—Nonreceipt of notice and findings. 
The fact that his counsel did not receive no-
tice and findings from the clerk of the court 
does not entitle an appellant to file out of time 
a motion to amend findings and decree, and a 
motion for a new trial. In re Bundy's Estate, 
121 Utah 299, 241 P.2d 462 (1952). 
—Trial court's discretion. 
Trial court has discretion in determining 
whether a movant has shown ''mistake, inad-
vertence, surprise, or excusable neglect," and 
the Supreme Court will reverse the trial 
court's ruling only when there has been an 
abuse of discretion. Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 
52 (Utah 1984). 
—Unemployment compensation appeal. 
An administrative law judge's refusal to con-
sider an employer's untimely protest of a deter-
mination of benefits by the department of em-
ployment security did not contravene a 
claimed public policy to relieve a party of de-
fault for "mistake" or "excusable neglect." 
Mini Spas, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 733 P.2d 
130 (Utah 1987). 
—Workmen's compensation appeal. 
Supreme Court could not relieve applicant 
from operation of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act section prescribing the time within 
which a writ of certiorari had to be applied for; 
fact that applicant's counsel was misinformed 
by commission's stenographer that there had 
185 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 60 
been no decision did not authorize granting of 
relief. Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 73 
Utah 199, 273 P. 306 (1928). 
Newly discovered evidence. 
—Burden of proof. 
The burden of showing facts to justify the 
granting of a new trial is upon one seeking 
such relief. Kettner v. Snow, 13 Utah 2d 382, 
375 P.2d 28 (1962). 
—Discretion not abused. 
District court held not to abuse its discretion 
in denying motion for new trial based on 
''newly discovered evidence." See Hall v. Fitz-
gerald, 671 P.2d 224 (Utah 1983); Putvin v. 
Thompson, 241 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994). 
Procedure. 
—Notice to parties. 
Motion to reconsider a motion is not provided 
for under these rules, but even if it were, trial 
court erred in hearing defendant's motion and 
acting upon it ex parte and without any notice 
to plaintiff. Utah State Employees Credit 
Union v. Riding, 24 Utah 2d 211, 469 P.2d 1 
(1970). 
Res judicata. 
A denial of a motion under this rule pre-
cludes a subsequent collateral attack on the 
judgment only if the claim or ground actually 
adjudicated in the Rule 60(b) motion is the 
same claim asserted in the independent action. 
Pepper v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 801 P.2d 144 
(Utah 1990). 
Reversal of judgment. 
—Invalidation of sale. 
Where real estate agent was granted default 
judgment against purchaser of home for uncol-
lected commission from sale, subsequent inval-
idation of purchaser's and seller's sales con-
tract warranted vacation of default judgment 
upon purchaser's motion. Kelly v. Scott, 5 Utah 
2d 159, 298 P.2d 821 (1956). 
Satisfaction, release or discharge. 
—Accord and satisfaction. 
A judgment defendant is not constrained to 
raise an alleged accord and satisfaction only as 
an affirmative defense to further attempts by a 
judgment creditor to enforce the terms of a 
judgment. Rather, the issue may be raised 
seeking direct judicial sanction of the satisfac-
tion by motion or independent action pursuant 
to Subdivision (b)(6). Sugarhouse Fin. Co. v. 
Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1980). 
When a judgment creditor accepted a prom-
issory note with greater consideration and dif-
ferent performance from the earlier judgment, 
he released the judgment debtor from the judg-
ment in an accord and satisfaction. Brimley v. 
Gasser, 754 P.2d 97 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
—Discharging representative of estate 
from further demand. 
Relief under this rule is available with re-
gard to an order under § 75-3-1001 discharg-
ing a personal representative of an estate from 
further claim or demand after a final order has 
been entered. Morgan v. Zions Nat'l Bank, 711 
P.2d 261 (Utah 1985). 
—Erroneously included damages. 
Defendant, whose insurance company had 
satisfied judgment against him in automobile 
accident action which erroneously included 
amounts plaintiff had received as PIP benefits 
under its insurance policy, could not seek to 
modify judgment to exclude erroneously in-
cluded amount by way of motion pursuant to 
either Subdivisions (b)(6) or (7). Laub v. South 
Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 
1982). 
—Prospective application of judgment. 
Rule permitting relief from a judgment on 
the basis that it is no longer equitable that the 
judgment have prospective application was in-
applicable between the parties when the judg-
ment had been satisfied by the party seeking 
relief. Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 
657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982). 
Timeliness of motion. 
A motion to set aside a judgment that is 
based on a reversed judgment must be made 
within a reasonable time. Guardian State 
Bank v. Stangl, 778 P.2d 1 (Utah 1989). 
Motion by natural mother to dismiss an 
adoption petition on the grounds of misrepre-
sentation by the adoptive parents, filed more 
than three months after the entry of her con-
sent to the adoption, was not timely, and the 
saving clause of this rule did not apply because 
she did not bring an independent action. M.L. 
v. V.H., 894 P.2d 1285 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
—Confused mental condition of party. 
There was no abuse of discretion in trial 
court's denial of plaintiffs motion to vacate or-
der dismissing action entered pursuant to re-
lease and stipulation of parties where motion 
was filed six and one-half years after plaintiffs 
physician detected plaintiffs confused mental 
condition urged as basis for vacating motion. 
Young v. Western Piling & Sheeting, 680 P.2d 
394 (Utah 1984). 
—Dismissal for lack of prosecution. 
Where the evidence indicated that plaintiff 
had not gotten in touch with his attorney for 
two years after filing complaint, it was proper 
for court to deny plaintiffs motion to set aside 
a judgment, dismissing his complaint for lack 
of prosecution. Pitman v. Bonham, 677 P.2d 
1126 (Utah 1984). 
A trial court's refusal to set aside a dismissal 
for failure to prosecute will not be overturned 
absent an abuse of discretion. Meadow Fresh 
Farms v. Utah State Univ. Dept. of Agric, 813 
P.2d 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in re-
fusing to set aside a dismissal for failure to 
prosecute, where the underlying events oc-
curred in 1981, an initial action filed in 1983 
was dismissed for lack of prosecution, and the 
instant action based on the same facts was not 
filed until 1988, by which time many of the 
potential witnesses might have moved out of 
state and/or their recollection of the circum-
stances and events might have dimmed. 
Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State Univ. 
Dept. of Agric, 813 P.2d 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
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-Fraud. 
A cross-complaint seeking to set aside a 
ldgment for fraud in its procurement may be 
rought after the time limit in Subdivision (b) 
Dr a motion to set aside a judgment. Bowen v. 
)lson, 122 Utah 66, 246 P.2d 602 (1952). 
Motion by ex-husband to order paternity 
ilood test to furnish evidence on possible modi-
ication of support decree, based on fraud on 
ourt, was governed by time limit in this rule 
md was too late when filed 14V2 months after 
livorce decree, even though baby was unborn 
md blood test could not have been performed 
>efore the divorce. McGavin v. McGavin, 27 
Jtah 2d 200, 494 P.2d 283 (1972). 
-Invalid service. 
The three-months provision provided for in 
Subdivision (b) for motions to vacate a judg-
nent has no application to a judgment which is 
roid because of invalid service of summons. 
.Voody v. Rhodes, 23 Utah 2d 249,461 P.2d 465 
1969). 
Where the judgment is void because of a 
'atally defective service of process, the time 
limitations of Subdivision (b) have no applica-
tion. Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288 (Utah 
L986). 
—Judicial error. 
Where judgment contained no clerical error 
amendable under Subdivision (a) but may have 
contained judicial error, trial court erred in 
granting motion to amend the judgment filed 
nine years after judgment was entered, since 
the error was not corrected by timely motion 
for new trial, appeal or suit in equity. Richards 
v. Siddoway, 24 Utah 2d 314, 471 P.2d 143 
(1970). 
—Jurisdiction. 
In suit for injunction, wherein it appeared 
that parties stipulated that hearing on dam-
ages be deferred and tried later, and court 
made order that plaintiff might later file 
amended or supplemental complaint with re-
spect to issue of damages, district court did not 
lose jurisdiction of case because damage issue 
was not determined during term of court at 
which injunction was granted and no applica-
tion for relief "in furtherance of justice" was 
made within six months after term. Utah Oil 
Ref. Co. v. District Court, 60 Utah 428, 209 P. 
624 (1922). 
—Mistake, inadvertence and neglect. 
A motion under Subdivision (b)(1) to set 
aside a default judgment on the ground of mis-
take, inadvertence, and excusable neglect of 
one's attorney, if made more than three 
months after the judgment was entered, is un-
timely and properly denied. Peck v. Cook, 29 
Utah 2d 375, 510 P.2d 530 (1973). 
—Newly discovered evidence. 
Father's petition to reopen a divorce judg-
ment, based on newly discovered evidence, to 
raise the issue of paternity of a child born dur-
ing the marriage was procedurally deficient 
and properly denied by the trial court where 
the petition was not filed within three months 
of the divorce judgment. Roche v. Roche, 596 
P.2d 647 (Utah 1979). 
—Order entered upon erroneous assump-
tion. 
A formal order signed and entered upon the 
erroneous assumption that it conformed to a 
direction of the court theretofore made after 
hearing on the merits is more than a mere in-
advertence, and can therefore be set aside more 
than three months after its entry, provided the 
motion is made within a reasonable time. 
Dixon v. Dixon, 121 Utah 259, 240 P.2d 1211. 
(1952). 
—"Reasonable time." 
Because a losing party moved to set aside the 
judgment against her within about a month 
after learning that the judgment had been en-
tered, and her ignorance of the judgment until 
that time was due in part to a lack of notice 
that the prevailing party was required to pro-
vide pursuant to Rule 58A(d), her motion was 
timely under Subdivision (b). Workman v. 
Nagle Constr., Inc., 802 P.2d 749 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). 
Although Utah has no statutory limitation 
period specific to adoptions, in recognition of 
the need for finality in adoption proceedings, 
court held that plaintiff's action, brought three 
and one-half years after adoption order was 
granted, was not brought within a "reasonable 
time" under Subdivision (b). Maertz v. Maertz, 
827 P.2d 259 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
—Reconsideration of previously denied 
motion. 
Trial court committed no error by first deny-
ing a motion for summary judgment made by 
the defendant, and then upon subsequent pro-
ceedings within the time limits of Subdivision 
(b) deciding to vacate that order and reconsid-
ering and granting defendant's motion. Rees v. 
Albertson's, Inc., 587 P.2d 130 (Utah 1978). 
—Satisfaction. 
The fact of prior satisfaction of the judgment 
is an important consideration in determining 
whether a motion to modify the judgment is 
made within a reasonable time. Laub v. South 
Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 
1982). 
Unauthorized appearance. 
Wife who had been personally served with 
process but had no actual knowledge of action 
was not entitled to relief from judgment 
against her and her husband on ground that 
appearance for her by attorney retained by 
husband was without her authority. Plaintiff 
would have been entitled to default judgment 
against wife, and his position could not be 
worsened by unauthorized appearance over 
which he had no control. Brimhall v. Mecham, 
27 Utah 2d 222, 494 P.2d 525 (1972). 
Void judgment 
—Basis. 
A judgment is void only if the court that ren-
dered it lacked jurisdiction over the subject 
matter or over the parties or was otherwise 
incompetent to render judgment; a judgment 
based on a void stipulation may be voidable, 
but is not void within the meaning of Subdivi-
sion (b)(5). Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons, 
817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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Lack of jurisdiction. 
It is a basic rule that a judgment is void and 
subject to collateral attack if lack of jurisdic-
tion in the court appears on the face of the 
record. Bowen v. Olson, 122 Utah 66, 246 P.2d 
602 (1952). 
Where the affidavit for publication of sum-
mons presented no evidentiary facte, a default 
judgment entered against the defendant can be 
attacked collaterally. Bowen v. Olson, 122 
Utah 66, 246 P.2d 602 (1952). 
A denial of a motion to vacate a judgment 
under Subdivision (b) is ordinarily reversed 
only for an abuse of discretion. However, when 
a motion to vacate a judgment is based on a 
claim of lack of jurisdiction, the district court 
has no discretion: if jurisdiction is lacking, the 
judgment cannot stand without denying due 
process to the one against whom it runs. State 
Dept. of Social Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130 
(Utah 1989). 
Cited in Goddard v. Bundy, 121 Utah 299, 
241 P.2d 462 (1952); Board of Educ. v. Cox, 16 
Utah 2d 20, 395 P.2d 55 (1964); Parker v. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments 
§ 740 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 228 et seq., 
237. 
A.L.R. — Incompetence of counsel as ground 
for relief from state court civil judgment, 64 
A.L.R.4th 323. 
Filing of notice of appeal as affecting juris-
diction of state trial court to consider motion to 
vacate judgment, 5 A.L.R.5th 422. 
Relief from judicial error by motion under 
F.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(1), 1 A.L.R. Fed. 771. 
Propriety of conditions imposed in granting 
relief from judgment under Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 60(b), 3 A.L.R. Fed. 956. 
Construction of Rule 60(a) of Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure authorizing correction of 
clerical mistakes and judgments, orders or 
other parts of the records and errors therein 
arising from oversight or omission, 13 A.L.R. 
Fed. 794. 
Independent actions to obtain relief from 
judgment, order, or proceeding under Rule 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 61, F.R.C.P. 
Rolfson, 525 P.2d 612 (Utah 1974); Dynapac, 
Inc. v. Innovations, Inc., 550 P.2d 191 (Utah 
1976); Olsen v. Cummings, 565 P.2d 1123 
(Utah 1977); Pitts v. Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc., 
589 P.2d 767 (Utah 1978); Peay v. Peay, 607 
P.2d 841 (Utah 1980); Miller Pontiac, Inc. v. 
Osborne, 622 P.2d 800 (Utah 1981); Kohler v. 
Garden City, 639 P.2d 162 (Utah 1981); St. 
Pierre v. Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615 (Utah 1982); 
Kanzee v. Kanzee, 668 P.2d 495 (Utah 1983); 
Pease v. Industrial Comm'n, 694 P.2d 613 
(Utah 1984); Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700 
(Utah 1985); In re Estate of Chasel, 725 P.2d 
1345 (Utah 1986); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 
(Utah 1986); Myers v. Garff, 655 F. Supp. 1021 
(D. Utah 1987); Wood v. Weenig, 736 P.2d 1053 
(Utah 1987); Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 
1318 (Utah 1987); Tripp v. Vaughn, 747 P.2d 
1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Blodgett v. Zions 
First Nat'l Bank, 752 P.2d 901 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988); Ramon ex rel. Ramon v. Fair, 770 P.2d 
131 (Utah 1989); Surety Life Ins. Co. v. Rupp, 
833 P.2d 366 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Holm v. 
Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
53 A.L.R. Fed. 558. 
Lack of jurisdiction, or jurisdictional error, 
as rendering federal district court judgment 
"void" for purposes of relief under Rule 60(b)(4) 
of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 59 A.L.R. 
Fed. 831. 
Effect of filing of notice of appeal on motion 
to vacate judgment under Rule 60(b) of Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 62 A.L.R. Fed. 165. 
Who has burden of proof in proceeding under 
Rule 60(b)(4) of Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure to have default judgment set aside on 
ground that it is void for lack of jurisdiction, 
102 A.L.R. Fed. 811. 
Construction and application of Rule 60(b)(5) 
of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, authoriz-
ing relief from final judgment where its pro-
spective application is inequitable, 117 A.L.R. 
Fed. 419. 
Key Numbers. — Judgment *=» 294 et seq., 
306, 307. 
Rule 61. Harmless error. 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error 
or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or 
by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturb-
ing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the 
court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the 
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does 
not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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of the court shall transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings upon 
the preparation of the entire record. 
(g) Appellate court determination. Upon receipt of the record from the 
trial court, the clerk of the court shall notify the parties of the new schedule 
for briefing or oral argument under these rules. Errors claimed to have been 
made during the trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to this rule are 
reviewable under the same standards as the review of errors in other appeals. 
The findings of fact entered pursuant to this rule are reviewable under the 
same standards as the review of findings of fact in other appeals. 
(Added effective October 1, 1992.) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Allegation of facts required. to remand a claim under this rule for a fishing 
Because defendant did not allege any facts in expedition. State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578 
support of his ineffective assistance claim, the (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 860 P. 943 (Utah 
appellate court would not remand the case for 1993). 
an evidentiary hearing. It would be improper 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or 
agency whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where 
the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. 
The list should be set out on p. separate page which appears immediately 
inside the cover. 
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with 
page references. 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with refer-
ences to the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each 
issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in 
the trial court; or 
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not pre-
served in the trial court. 
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regula-
tions whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central 
importance to the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate 
citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation 
alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an addendum to 
the brief under paragraph (11) of this rule. 
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly 
the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the 
court below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for 
review shall follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceed-
ings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with 
paragraph (e) of this rule. 
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably 
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually 
made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the 
heading under which the argument is arranged. 
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and rea-
sons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the 
grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with 
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. 
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
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(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is 
necessary under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of 
the brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the ad-
dendum is bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table of con-
tents. The addendum shall contain a copy of: 
(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of cen-
tral importance cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the 
brief; 
(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of 
Appeals opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance 
to the appeal but not available to the court as part of a regularly 
published reporter service; and 
(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central impor-
tance to the determination of the appeal, such as the challenged 
instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum 
decision, the transcript of the courts oral decision, or the contract or 
document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not 
include: 
(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissat-
isfied with the statement of the appellant; or 
(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the adden-
dum of the appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the 
appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the 
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief 
in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-
appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in 
the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the require-
ments of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further briefs may 
be filed except with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their 
briefs and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such 
designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the 
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the 
actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the 
injured person," "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the 
pages of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of 
any statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared 
pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to exhibits shall be made to the 
exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is 
in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the 
evidence was identified, offered, and received or rejected. 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs 
shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive 
of pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any adden-
dum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as re-
quired by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, para-
graph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the 
party first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the 
purposes of this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the 
court otherwise orders. The brief of the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages in 
length. The brief of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the issues and 
arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of 
the appellant and shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The appellant shall 
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then file a brief which contains an answer to the original issues raised by the 
appellee/cross-appellant and a reply to the appellee's response to the issues 
raised in the appellant's opening brief. The appellant's second brief shall not 
exceed 25 pages in length. The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second 
brief, not to exceed 25 pages in length, which contains only a reply to the 
appellant's answers to the original issues raised by the appellee/cross-appel-
lant's first brief. The lengths specified by this rule are exclusive of table of 
contents, table of authorities, and addenda and may be exceeded only by 
permission of the court. The court shall grant reasonable requests, for good 
cause shown. 
(h) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases 
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated 
for purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and 
any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of 
another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(i) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant 
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been 
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise 
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An origi-
nal letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original 
letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a 
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the 
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for 
the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing 
and shall be similarly limited. 
(j) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be con-
cise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and 
free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs 
which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua 
sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offend-
ing lawyer. 
(k) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy cover stock and 
shall comply with Rule 27. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — The brief 
must now contain for each issue raised on ap-
peal, a statement of the applicable standard of 
review and citation of supporting authority. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective October 1, 1992, added the 
third sentence in Subdivision (c) and made sty-
listic changes in Subdivisions (a)(5) and (7). 
The 1994 amendment added the addendum 
requirement in Subdivision (a)(2); added Sub-
divisions (a)(5)(A) and (B); inserted "or of cen-
ta l importance to the appeal" in Subdivision 
!a)(6); inserted "including the grounds for re-
viewing any issue not preserved in the trial 
jourt" in Subdivision (9); added Subdivision 
a)(ll), deleted Subdivision (f), relating to re-
)roduction of statutes, documents, and similar 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutional arguments. 
Contents. 
—Argument. 
-Inappropriate language. 
-Standard of review. 
-Statement of facts with citation to record. 
failure to file. 
i  material, and made related changes through-
>- out the rule; added Subdivision (b)(2); deleted a 
>f reference to Subdivision (a)(6) from the cita-
tion near the end of Subsection (c); deleted the 
I  reporter's transcript from the list in the first 
sentence in Subdivision (e) and substituted 
r
 "record" for "transcript" near the end of the 
last sentence; and made stylistic changes 
Q throughout. 
>- The 1995 amendment added the provision 
i  for cases reviewed on certiorari in Subdivision 
ti (a)(ll); added the second sentence in Subdivi-
i  sion (f); and, in Subdivision (g), added the 50-
L1 page limit, substituted "apellee/cross-appel-
ti lant" for "appellee" in the third sentence, and 
5- all the language beginning with the fourth 
 sentence. 
—Defective appeal. 
Properly documented argument. 
Reply brief. 
Cited. 
Constitutional arguments. 
In order to make an argument for an innova-
tive interpretation of a state constitutional 
provision textually similar to a federal provi-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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sion, the following points should be developed 
and supported with authority and analysis. 
First, counsel should offer analysis of the 
unique context in which Utah's constitution 
developed with regard to the issue at hand. 
Second, counsel should demonstrate that state 
appellate courts regularly interpret even 
textually similar state constitutional provi-
sions in a manner different from federal inter-
pretations of the United States Constitution 
and that it is entirely proper to do so in our 
federal system. Third, citation should be made 
to authority from other states supporting the 
particular construction urged by counsel. State 
v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Contents. 
A brief must contain some support for each 
contention. State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960 
(Utah 1989); State v. Reiners, 803 P.2d 1300 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Extensive quotations from numerous case 
authorities and treatises, while helpful, cannot 
substitute for the development of appellate ar-
guments explicitly tied to the record. West 
Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Appellant's brief was clearly deficient under 
the provisions of this rule because it failed to 
set forth a coherent statement of issues and the 
appropriate standard of review for each issue 
with supporting authority, the "issues" where 
listed did not correlate with the substance of 
the brief, the statement of the case not only 
omitted reference to the course of proceedings 
and disposition in the trial court, but failed to 
provide a statement of the relevant facts prop-
erly documented by citations to the record, and 
defendant's "argument" did not identify any 
error by the trial court, refer to the facts or the 
record, or cite applicable authority, much less 
provide any meaningful factual or legal analy-
sis. State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). 
It is improper to use an addendum to incor-
porate argument by reference that should be 
included in the body of the brief. State v. Jiron, 
866 P.2d 1249 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Appellate orief that set forth little legal 
analysis on issue presented, did not specifically 
discuss how trial court erred, did not attempt 
to marshal the evidence, and presented no cita-
tions to record failed to conform to require-
ments of this rule. Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 
P.2d 1108 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
—Argument. 
Appellants' brief, containing less than a sin-
gle page of assertions and no citations to the 
record, no legal authorities, and no analysis 
whatsoever, was not in compliance with this 
nile, which requires the brief of an appellant to 
contain an argument. Christensen v. Munns, 
812 P.2d 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Court declined to consider argument that 
was not adequately briefed. See State v. Yates, 
834 P.2d 599 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Defendant's failure to brief the applicability 
of a common law construction (the good faith 
exception to the warrant requirement) under 
the Utah Constitution at the trial court level 
and his subsequent failure to develop any 
meaningful argument thereunder did not per-
mit higher appellate review of these state con-
stitutional claims, but left the analysis to pro-
ceed solely under federal constitutional law. 
State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). 
—Inappropriate language. 
Derogatory references to others or inappro-
priate language of any kind has no place in an 
appellate brief and is of no assistance in at-
tempting to resolve any legitimate issues pre-
sented on appeal. State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296 
(Utah 1986). 
—Standard of review. 
The standard of review requirement in Sub-
division (a)(5) should not be ignored. The pur-
pose of the requirement is to focus the briefs, 
thus promoting more accuracy and efficiency 
in the processing of appeals. Christensen v. 
Munns, 812 P.2d 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
—Statement of facts with citation to 
record. 
The Supreme Court need not, and will not, 
consider any facte not properly cited to, or sup-
ported by, the record. Uckerman v. Lincoln 
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978). 
The Supreme Court will assume the correct-
ness of the judgment in a criminal trial if coun-
sel on appeal does not comply with the require-
ments as to making a concise statement of 
facts and citation of the pages in the record 
where they are supported. State v. Tucker, 657 
P.2d 755 (Utah 1982). 
If a party fails to make a concise statement 
of the facts and citation of the pages in the 
record where those facts are supported, the 
court will assume the correctness of the judg-
ment below. Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746 
P.2d 1182 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Steele v. 
Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 845 P.2d 
960 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Failure to file. 
—Defective appeal. 
Where defendant was convicted of operating 
a motor vehicle without insurance, and at-
tempted to file his appeal pro se, but failed to 
file a brief or submit a transcript of the record, 
there was no reversible error presented which 
would permit the appellate court to reverse the 
judgment. State v. Hansen, 540 P.2d 935 (Utah 
1975). 
Properly documented argument 
Brief that was filled with burdensome, emo-
tional, immaterial and inaccurate arguments 
did not set forth a properly documented argu-
ment as required by this rule; therefore the 
court disregarded it. Koulis v. Standard Oil 
Co., 746 P.2d 1182 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Reply brief. 
As a general rule, an issue raised initially in 
a reply brief will not be considered on appeal, 
although the court, in its discretion, may de-
cided a case upon any points that its proper 
disposition may require, even if first raised in 
a reply brief. Romrell v. Zions First Nat'l 
Bank, 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980). 
Cited in Weber v. Snyderville West, 800 
P.2d 316 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Hoyt, 
806 P.2d 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State ex 
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rel. M.S. v. Salata, 806 P.2d 1216 (Utah Ct. v. Garza, 820 P.2d 937 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); 
App. 1991); State v. Cayer, 814 P.2d 604 (Utah Johnson-Bowles Co. v. Department of Com-
Ct. App. 1991); English v. Standard Optical merce, 829 P.2d 101 (Utah Ct App. 1991); 
Co., 814 P.2d 613 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Middlestadt v. Indus. Comm'n, 852 P.2d 1012 
Hinckley v. Hinckley, 815 P.2d 1352 (Utah Ct. (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 
App. 1991); Larson v. Overland Thrift & Loan, 540 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Barney v. Utah 
818 P.2d 1316 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Dep't of Commerce, 885 P.2d 809 (Utah Ct. 
Davis, 821 P.2d 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State App. 1994). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error *=» 755 
Error §§ 684 to 690. to 807. 
C.J.S. — 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 605 et 
seq. 
Rule 25. Brief of an amicus curiae or guardian ad litem. 
A brief of an amicus curiae or of a guardian ad litem representing a minor 
who is not a party to the appeal may be filed only if accompanied by written 
consent of all parties, or by leave of court granted on motion or at the request 
of the court. A motion for leave shall identify the interest of the applicant and 
shall state the reasons why a brief of an amicus curiae or the guardian ad 
litem is desirable. Except as all parties otherwise consent, an amicus curiae or 
guardian ad litem shall file its brief within the time allowed the party whose 
position as to affirmance or reversal the amicus curiae or guardian ad litem 
will support, unless the court for cause shown otherwise orders. A motion of 
an amicus curiae or guardian ad litem to participate in the orai argument will 
be granted when circumstances warrant in the court's discretion. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jm\ 2d Appeal and 
Error § 687. 
Rule 26. Filing and service of briefs. 
(a) Time for service and filing briefs. Briefs shall be deemed filed on the 
date of the postmark if first-class mail is utilized. The appellant shall serve 
and file a brief within 40 days after date of notice from the clerk of the 
appellate court pursuant to Rule 13, unless a motion for summary disposition 
of the appeal or a motion to remand for determination of ineffective assistance 
of counsel has been previously interposed, in which event service and filing 
shall be within 30 days from the denial of such motion. The appellee, or in 
cases involving a cross-appeal, the appellee/cross-appellant, shall serve and 
file a brief within 30 days after service of the appellant's brief. In cases involv-
ing cross-appeals, the appellant shall serve and file the second brief described 
in Rule 24(g) within 30 days after service of the appellee/cross-appellant's 
brief. A reply brief may be served and filed by the appellant or the appel-
iee/cross-appellant in cases involving cross-appeals. If a reply brief is filed, it 
shall be served and filed within 30 days after the filing and service of the 
appellee's brief or the appellant's second brief in cases involving cross-appeals, 
[f oral argument is scheduled fewer than 35 days after the filing of appellee's 
3rief, the reply brief must be filed at least 5 days prior to oral argument. By 
itipulation filed with the court in accordance with Rule 21(a), the parties may 
extend each of such periods for no more than 30 days. A motion for enlarge-
nent of time need not accompany the stipulation. No such stipulation shall be 
effective unless it is filed prior to the expiration of the period sought to be 
extended. 
(b) Number of copies to be filed and served. For matters pending in the 
Supreme Court, ten copies of each brief, one of which shall contain an original 
dgnature, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. For matters 
ending in the Court of Appeals, eight copies of each brief, one of which shall 
contain an original signature, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court of 
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Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery 
of attorney's fees, 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of 
right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal 
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just 
damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, 
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order 
that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, 
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or 
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for 
the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to 
harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will 
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
(c) Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its 
own motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of 
the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of 
the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other 
paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court 
shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show 
cause why such damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause 
shall set forth the allegations which form the basis of the damages and 
permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for 
good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of 
oral argument. 
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the 
court shall grant a hearing. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 33 is 
substantially redrafted to provide definitions 
and procedures for assessing penalties for de-
lays and frivolous appeals. 
If an appeal is found to be frivolous, the court 
must award damages. This is in keeping with 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
However, the amount of damages — single or 
double costs or attorney fees or both — is left to 
the discretion of the court. Rule 33 is amended 
to make express the authority of the court to 
ANALYSIS 
Frivolous appeal. 
—Defined. 
—Sanctions. 
Cited. 
Frivolous appeal. 
A husband's appeal from a judgment relat-
ing to alimony and distribution of marital 
property was frivolous, where there was no ba-
sis for the argument presented and the evi-
dence and law was mischaracterized and mis-
stated. Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah 
1987). 
Plaintiff's counsel violated rule and was 
therefore subject to sanction when, after he in-
vestigated plaintiff's malpractice action 
against defendant orthodontist and found that 
he could not prove breach of duty or causation, 
impose sanctions upon the party or upon coun-
sel for the party. This rule does not apply to a 
first appeal of right in a criminal case to avoid 
the conflict created for appointed counsel by 
Anders v. California, 386 US 738 (1967) and 
State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981). 
Under the law of these cases, appointed coun-
sel must file an appeal and brief if requested by 
the defendant, and the court must find the ap-
peal to be frivolous in order to dismiss the ap-
peal. 
the record was devoid of any relevant, admissi-
ble evidence showing negligence, and after los-
ing on summary judgment, he persisted in fil-
ing an appeal. Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414 
(Utah 1990). 
An appeal brought from an action that was 
properly determined to be in bad faith is neces-
sarily frivolous under this rule. Utah Dep't of 
Social Serve, v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). 
Attorney who, after a case had been fully 
adjudicated, chose to ignore the decision and 
attempted to relitigate the same case violated 
Subdivision (a) of this rule and was therefore 
subject to sanctions. Schoney v. Memorial Es-
tates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
—Defined. 
For purposes of this rule, a "frivolous" appeal 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Rule 3 4 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 468 
is one having no reasonable legal or factual Cited in Barber v. Barber, 792 P.2d 134 
basis. Lack of good faith is not required. (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Hurt v. Hurt, 793 P.2d 
O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 948 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Mahas v. 
1987). Rindlisbacher, 808 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1990); 
A frivolous appeal is one without reasonable Govert Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 801 
legal or factual basis. Backstrom Family Ltd.
 R 2 d 1 6 3 mah Ct. App. 1990); Mont Trucking, 
Partnership v Hall, 751 P.2d 1157 (Utah Ct
 In(, y Enti&d& ^ j g 0 2 p 2 d ? ? 9 ( U t a h 
^ f ? W VM UB ' Ct- APP- !990): Allred v. Allred, 807 P.2d 350 
156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
 ( u t a h C t A p p 1 9 9 1 ) . W a l t e r s y W a l t e r f l > g l 2 
—Sanctions.
 P 2 d 64 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Griffin v. 
Sanctions for frivolous appeals should only
 Memmott 8 1 4 P - 2 d 6 0 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); 
be applied in egregious cses , to avoid chilling
 H i n c k l v. Hinckley, 815 P.2d 1352 (Utah Ct. 
the right to appeal erroneous lower court deci-
 A 1 y L Q ^ T h r f f t & ^ 
sions. However, sanctions should be imposed
 01\f „ OJ ., ' /TT. , ~, A i n n i N ^ , . 
when an appeal is obviously without any merit ^ P - M " J 6 ^ Q ° q S ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ b ^ ' 
and has been taken with no reasonable likeli- ^ e r t s > Q™*M 1 9 3 ^tah Ct App 1992); 
hood ofprevailing.Porcov.Porco, 752 P.2d 365 Holm v- Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 (Utah Ct. 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); Maughan v. Maughan, APP- 1992>; Rimensburger v. Rimensburger, 
770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). ^5 p-2<* 960 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and court to impose monetary sanctions on counsel 
Error § 912. in absence of contempt of court, 77 A.L.R. Fed. 
C.J.S. — 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 637. 789. 
A.L.R. — Inherent power of federal district Key Numbers. — Costs *=» 259 to 263. 
Rule 34. Award of costs. 
(a) To whom allowed. Except as otherwise provided by law, if an appeal is 
dismissed, costs shall be taxed against the appellant unless otherwise agreed 
by the parties or ordered by the court; if a judgment or order is affirmed, costs 
shall be taxed against appellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or 
order is reversed, costs shall be taxed against the appellee unless otherwise 
ordered; if a judgment or order is affirmed or reversed in part, or is vacated, 
costs shall be allowed as ordered by the court. Costs shall not be allowed or 
taxed in a criminal case. 
(b) Costs for and against the state of Utah. In cases involving the state 
of Utah or an agency or officer thereof, an award of costs for or against the 
state shall be at the discretion of the court unless specifically required or 
prohibited by law. 
(c) Costs of briefs and attachments, record, bonds and other ex-
penses on appeal. The following may be taxed as costs in favor of the pre-
vailing party in the appeal: the actual costs of a printed or typewritten brief or 
memoranda and attachments not to exceed $3.00 for each page; actual costs 
incurred in the preparation and transmission of the record, including costs of 
the reporter's transcript unless otherwise ordered by the court; premiums paid 
for supersedeas or cost bonds to preserve rights pending appeal; and the fees 
for filing and docketing the appeal. 
(d) Bill of costs taxed after remittitur. When costs are awarded to a party 
in an appeal, a party claiming costs shall, within 15 days after the remittitur 
is filed with the clerk of the trial court, serve upon the adverse party and file 
with the clerk of the trial court an itemized and verified bill of costs. The 
adverse party may, within 5 days of service of the bill of costs, serve and file a 
notice of objection, together with a motion to have the costs taxed by the trial 
court. If there is no objection to the cost bill within the allotted time, the clerk 
of the trial court shall tax the costs as filed and enter judgment for the party 
entitled thereto, which judgment shall be entered in the judgment docket with 
the same force and effect as in the case of other judgments of record. If the cost 
bill of the prevailing party is timely opposed, the clerk, upon reasonable notice 
and hearing, shall tax the costs and enter a final determination and judgment 
which shall thereupon be entered in the judgment docket with the same force 
and effect as in the case of other judgments of record. The determination of the 
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(c) Minute book. The clerk may keep a minute book, in which shall be 
entered a record of the daily proceedings of the court. The clerk shall prepare, 
under the direction of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or the Presiding 
Judge of the Court of Appeals, a calendar of cases awaiting argument. In 
placing cases on the calendar for argument, the clerk shall give preference to 
appeals in accordance with the priority of cases provided in Rule 29. 
(d) Notice of orders. Immediately upon the entry of an order or decision, 
the clerk shall serve a notice of entry by mail upon each party to the proceed-
ing, together with a copy of any opinion respecting the order or decision. 
Service on a party represented by counsel shall be made upon counsel. 
(e) Custody of records and papers. The clerk shall have custody of the 
records and papers of the court. The clerk shall not permit any original record 
or paper to be removed from the court, except as authorized by these rules or 
the orders or instructions of the court. Original papers transmitted as the 
record on appeal or review shall upon disposition of the case be returned to the 
court or agency from which they were received. The clerk shall preserve copies 
of briefs and attachments, as well as other printed papers filed. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- division (c) designation and heading and redes-
ment, effective October 1,1992, added the Sub- ignated the following subdivisions accordingly. 
Rule 40. Attorney's or party's certificate; sanctions and 
discipline. 
(a) Attorney's or party's certificate. Every motion, brief, and other paper 
of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney 
of record who is an active member in good standing of the Bar of this state. 
The attorney shall sign his or her individual name and give his or her busi-
ness address, telephone number, and Utah State Bar number. A party who is 
not represented by an attorney shall sign any motion, brief, or other paper 
and state the party's address and telephone number. Except when otherwise 
specifically provided by rule or statute, motions, briefs, or other papers need 
not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The signature of an attorney or 
party constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party has read the motion, 
brief, or other paper; that to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and 
belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, it is not frivolous or interposed for the 
purpose of delay as defined in Rule 33. If a motion, brief, or other paper is not 
signed as required by this rule, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly 
after the omission is called to the attention of the attorney or party. If a 
motion, brief, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the authority 
and the procedures of the court provided by Rule 33 shall apply. 
(b) Sanctions and discipline of attorneys and parties. The court may, 
after reasonable notice and an opportunity to show cause to the contrary, and 
upon hearing, if requested, take appropriate action against any attorney or 
person who practices before it for inadequate representation of a client, con-
duct unbecoming a member of the Bar or a person allowed to appear before the 
court, or for failure to comply with these rules or order of the court. Any action 
to suspend or disbar a member of the Utah State Bar shall be referred to the 
Ethics and Discipline Committee of the State Bar for proceedings in accor-
dance with the Rules of Discipline of the State Bar. 
(c) Rule does not affect contempt power. This rule shall not be con-
strued to limit or impair the court's inherent and statutory contempt powers. 
(d) Appearance of counsel pro hac vice. An attorney who is licensed to 
practice before the bar of another state or a foreign country but who is not a 
member of the Bar of this state, may appear, upon motion, pro hac vice. Such 
attorney shall associate with an active member in good standing of the Bar of 
this state and shall be subject to the provisions of this rule and all other rules 
of appellate procedure. 
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Advisory Committee Note. — The rule is court with counsel's Bar number and business 
amended to require that counsel provide the telephone number. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Govert Copier Painting v. Van 
Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Award of damages for dilatory tac- Adequacy of defense counsel's representation 
tics in prosecuting appeal in state court, 91 of criminal client regarding appellate and post-
A.L.R.3d 661. conviction remedies, 15 A.L.R.4th 582. 
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation Attorneys: revocation of state court pro hac 
of criminal client regarding post-plea reme- vice admission, 64 A.L.R.4th 1217. 
dies, 13 A.L.R.4th 533. Key Numbers. — Costs *» 252. 
TITLE VI. 
CERTIFICATION AND TRANSFER BETWEEN 
COURTS. 
Rule 41. Certification of questions of law by United 
States courts. 
(a) Authorization to answer questions of law. The Utah Supreme Court 
may answer a question of Utah law certified to it by a court of the United 
States when requested to do so by such certifying court acting in accordance 
with the provisions of this rule if the state of the law of Utah applicable to a 
proceeding before the certifying court is uncertain. 
(b) Procedure to invoke. Any court of the United States may invoke this 
rule by entering an order of certification as described in this rule. When 
invoking this rule, the certifying court may act either sua sponte or upon a 
motion by any party. 
(c) Certification order. 
(1) A certification order shall be directed to the Utah Supreme Court 
and shall state: 
(A) the question of law to be answered; 
(B) that the question certified is a controlling issue of law in a 
proceeding pending before the certifying court; and 
(C) that there appears to be no controlling Utah law. 
(2) The order shall also set forth all facts which are relevant to the 
determination of the question certified and which show the nature of the 
controversy, the context in which the question arose, and the procedural 
steps by which the question was framed. 
(3) The certifying court may also include in the order any additional 
reasons for its entry of the certification order that are not otherwise 
apparent. 
(d) Form of certification order; submission of record. A certification 
order shall be signed by the judge presiding over the proceeding giving rise to 
the certification order and forwarded to the Utah Supreme Court by the clerk 
of the certifying court under its official seal. The Supreme Court may require 
that all or any portion of the record before the certifying court be filed with 
the Supreme Court if the record or a portion thereof may be necessary in 
determining whether to accept the certified question or in answering that 
question. A copy of the record certified by the clerk of the certifying court to 
conform to the original may be substituted for the original as the record. 
(e) Acceptance or rejection of certification. Upon filing of the certifica-
tion order and accompanying papers with the clerk, the Supreme Court shall 
promptly enter an order either accepting or rejecting the question certified to 
it, and the clerk shall serve copies of the order upon the certifying court and 
all parties identified in the certification order. If the Supreme Court accepts 
the question, the Court will set out in the order of acceptance (1) the specific 
78-2-1.5 JUDICIAL CODE 
78-2-1.5, 78-2-1.6. Repealed. 
Repeals. - Section 78-2-1.5 (L. 1969, ch. Section 78-2-1.6 (L. 1979, ch. 134, § 1; 1981, 
225, § 2), relating to salaries of Supreme Court ch. 156, § 1), relating to salaries of justices, 
justices, was repealed by Laws 1971, ch. 182, was repealed by Laws 1981, ch. 267, § 2, effec-
§ 4. tive July 1, 1982. 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state 
law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to 
final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originat-
ing with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(hi) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; 
(v) the state engineer; or 
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources 
reviewing actions of the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a s ta tu te of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree 
or capital felony; 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees 
ruling on legislative subpoenas. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
mat ters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except: 
(a j capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a 
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(bj election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(ej matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those mat ters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d). 
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